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Abstract
Data and information are integral to the modern economic system. Advances in technology
have allowed companies to both collect and utilize vast amounts of data. At times this data
can be very private and collected surreptitiously. Smartphones and other devices that keep
us in constant contact with the internet provide companies like Google and Facebook with a
wealth of information to sell. Despite all this, there currently does not exist a systematic way
to value data. In the absence of such valuations, gross economic inefficiencies are inevitable.
In this thesis, we seek to model ways in which data can be bought, sold, and used fairly
in an economic environment. We also develop a theory to value data in different settings.
Our models and results are applied to a variety of different domains to demonstrate their
efficacy. Results from game theory and mathematical programming allow us to provide fair
and efficient allocations of data. This research shows that there exists an efficient and fair
method with which to determine the value of information and data and to trade it fairly.
Thesis Supervisor: Munther A. Dahleh
Title: William A. Coolidge Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In November 1856 at the height of the Crimean war, an unknown nurse arrived in
southern Ukraine. What Florence Nightingale found at the British army hospital was
unbelievable. In war, tragedies are unavoidable, but what Nightingale observed wasn't
battle killing soldiers, it was medicine. Poor hospital sanitation was leading to the bulk
of deaths among soldiers. Nightingale used statistics to persuade military leaders to im-
prove sanitation, resulting in a drop in the death rate from 42% to 2%. This dramatic
improvement was the product of the acquisition and interpretation of data. The ability
to extrapolate from experience and learn from data propelled a little known hominid from
its enclave in western Africa to the dominant species on the planet in the evolutionary
blink of an eye. For millennia, the knowledge of which rocks made the best arrowheads
to which roots were safe to eat to how to use the stars to navigate was indispensable in
the expansion and success of our species. This knowledge came from data. Without input,
the human learning machine would be lost. Data is the lifeblood of humanity's success.
If information and data were valu-
able in the 1 9 th century, it is noth-
ing compared to their importance in
the modern world. From finance to
insurance to your washing machine,
data gives systems the ability to make
better informed decisions (including
the optimal composition of a portfolio
or your preferred tumble dry setting.)
The ability to process information has
grown hand in hand with increases in
computing power. No longer do statis-
ticians have to rely on painstakingly
hand-collected data. Modern technol-
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Figure 1-1: Florence Nightingale's Statistics.
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ogy gives us a repository of information larger than we even know what to do with. It is
partially for this that machine learning has gone from a relatively obscure branch of statistics
and computer science to the hottest academic topic taught in schools today.
While machine learning has made great strides, several issues remain. Modern machine
learning is highly domain specific. For example, algorithms that work quite well with data
collected from one distribution might not work well for data collected from another. Algo-
rithms that are quite successful at using sparse medical data might fail miserably when used
to analyze high dimensional financial data. Different application domains require different
tasks. Google uses website data to solve an eigenvalue problem to produce search results.
Such an approach would not work if one wanted to predict the price of Google's stock in a
month's time. In this way, machine learning consists of a menagerie of different algorithms
cobbled together, most being specialized to particular problems in particular settings. Many
of these algorithms don't even have provable performance guarantees. Clearly these methods
are highly dependent data structure and on the required task. Hence, the value of data to
one algorithm that can use it, might be very different to one that cannot.
Furthermore, sources of information are becoming more aware and more reticent to release
data. Consider the recent hacks of Equifax which resulted in a leak of sensitive private
information on more than 100 million Americans. This data was originally collected by
Equifax without the knowledge or consent of these individuals, highlighting the importance
of modern privacy. It remains to be seen whether future legislation will address these issues,
however, the ability to control where your data goes is something more and more people are
becoming concerned about. As such, some data is destined to become a scarce resource in the
future as individuals recognize and correct their breaches of privacy. Thus, machine learning
algorithms should be designed to acquire useful data while at the same time mitigating
privacy concerns.
One solution to these problems would be to monetize data transmission. If google would
like to use my search history to give me personalized advertisements, they must pay me
something. While we understand much more about data collection and manipulation than
we used to, the economics of information transfer is practically unstudied. There is currently
no systematic way to assign value to data. Despite this, individuals are beginning to realize
the value of their own data. It has become common practice, for example, to hide one's
location and browsing online when shopping for airline tickets as different online retailers
will increase their prices if they see you've previously shopped for particular tickets. The
value of data and the value of privacy are two sides of the same coin, each resulting from a
cycle of learning and resulting outcomes.
This thesis seeks to find a solution to the problem of valuing information. We develop
a structure through which data can be bought and sold fairly and describe under what
conditions optimal learning or profit can occur. We show how the economics of data and
information differ from other types of assets and develop specialized analysis techniques to
both value information and model market dynamics. Before this however, it would be nice
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to develop some intuition about this problem. Consider the following examples.
1.1 Examples
Example 1
During the financial crisis in 2008, many factors contributed to a sudden systemic economic
failure. One component was uncertainty surrounding certain types of complex financial
instruments. Assets like securitized mortgages played a part in stoking and maintaining the
panic that led to the downturn. Let's place ourselves in the shoes of a financial firm in 2006,
before the crisis hit, who is considering either buying or selling such securitized mortgages.
In order to make a decision on whether or not to buy or sell such assets, we as the firm must
make a decision about what these assets are worth. To do so requires a minor digression on
the structure of these investments.
A mortgage-backed security, made infamous in the aftermath of the great recession, is
simply a mixture of different pieces of debt. In general, securitization is a technique to
transform illiquid asset which generate receivables into securities that may be bought and
sold in the open market. The process of securitization requires that first the originator
of the assets create a portfolio of unwanted assets. Next, this pool of assets is sold to an
intermediate financial firm who finances this acquisition by issuing tradable, interest-bearing
securities. Investors who buy such securities receive interest from the returns on the asset.
In the specific case of mortgage backed securities, banks package and sell unwanted mortgage
debt to financial firms who package this debt in the form of securities to sell to investors.
Banks still collect on the loans and pass on profits, minus a small fee, to the financial firm
who in turn yields most of that profit to the investors. The way that firms package this
debt however is to split up individual pieces of debt into tiny pieces, and then recollect
these pieces based upon their riskiness. For example, if you were to go out and buy one of
these securities, it would contain small pieces of hundreds if not thousands of mortgages,
This means that when your neighbors, or equally a household across the country, pays their
mortgage this month and your security stipulates that you own 1% of their debt, you will
receive 1% of their interest (minus some processing fee.) Thus, securitization is a means of
diversifying the risk of an asset.
Now let's get back to the firm trying to value such securities. It is clear that their value
is directly associated with the probability that each of the mortgages get paid each month.
However, since securitization may pack a huge number of assets into one security, one would
need to know the default rate on the same large number of mortgages spread across the US
(or even the world.) Hence, data on mortgage payments would be central in determining
its value. The banks issuing individual loans still collect on them after securitization and
would have access to data such as payment history and other personal information. They
could sell this information to financial firms who would in turn be able to form an accurate
assessment of the value of these securities, allowing them to make optimal decisions in the
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future.
Mathematically speaking, let us consider a security to be a vector s E R' such that si
represents the percentage of each piece of n debts. Then, to simplify matters somewhat,
say that each of the debts di are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables paying 1 with probability
pi and 0 with probability 1 - pi. Hence, given some sample of the debts, the profit of the
security is defined as sid. For this reason, it would be helpful to know the values pi in
order to calculate the expected value of the investment. Thus, our goal as the financial firm
is to obtain data to learn the expected value of the security by learning the pi's. In order to
do this we have access to several pieces of information:
1. We know that each piece of debt di we hold in the security has some associated features
(e.g. type of employment, location etc.) represented by the vector vi
2. For each piece of debt di we hold a prior belief on the possible distribution of pi given
by Pi(pi).
3. Banks who lend to households have access to vi and the payment history hi E R'
which is simply a time series with entries {0, 1}.
4. Each bank can sell the pair (hi, vi).
With these conditions established, it becomes clear that our goal is to design a function
f : R" -+ R with the property that f(vi) ~ pt. With this, we can accurately calculate both
the distribution and the expectation of the returns of the security s. Then we would be
able to determine if the security is under or overpriced, and what its risk is to then behave
accordingly. All we need in order to learn the function f is access to data (hi, vi) which we
may purchase from banks.
The question then becomes, how much should we
purchase this information for. To answer this ques-
tion, first we need to define our utility as a financial
firm. In other words, we need a quantitative descrip-
tion of how much we value accuracy in predicting the
values of the pi. Suppose this function takes the form
U(f, s) = sigi(f (vi), pi) where gi is some mono-
tone decreasing function in If(vi) - piI with maxi-
mum where f(vi) = pi. Then, suppose we have an
algorithm A that takes as in the prior distribution Pi
and the data (hi, vi) and returns a new distribution
Pi such that as T -+ oo, A(Pi, (hi, vi)) approaches
the dirac delta function P (p) -+ 6 (pi - p). In other
words, with infinite information, the algorithm allows
0.14-
0.12-
0.10-
0.06-
0.02 -
0.00
PMF for Returns on Security s
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Figure 1-2: The goal of the firm is to esti-
mate the PMF of the security s, seen above.
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us to exactly learn the value of pi. Then one may suppose that the value of the information,
and hence the amount we pay for (vi, hi) to us is exactly the marginal change in U given
this data is processed by A. Sadly, this doesn't work, since in terms of our utility we are
equally well off simply not buying any data and there is no incentive to learn.
One further complication is the addition of other financial firms competing with us. It
may be the case that the more other firms learn there we lose utility commensurately. We
want to find a fair, systematic way to obtain information from banks, or vendors of data,
who have the ability to sell to multiple firms. Such a system does not exist to date. One
of the goals of this thesis is to find a mechanism that, given some sources of data and firms
who want to use that data, assigns an allocation of data in a fair way.
This example highlights the multifaceted nature of this problem. In order to assign value
to data, one must consider the preferences of those selling and buying it, the preferences
and information held by other sources and buyers of information, the combinatorial value
of subsets of data and the method with which data is learned. Such a problem might seem
intractable, however, it consists'of only three major pieces. First, we need to understand the
economics designing a market to share data. Second a thorough knowledge of the domain
from which the information originated is integral to data valuation. Finally, in order to cal-
culate the value of data, an algorithmic mechanism must factor in domain specific knowledge
and economic preferences to produce an allocation.
Example 2
Rare diseases like ALS are particularly difficult to research for several reasons. First of all,
there is minimal data. If a drug company wanted to develop a new therapy to manage or cure
such a disease, the sample size they could work with is incredibly small. It is also difficult to
justify the large cost of this development in order to sell a drug to such a small population,
despite the possible improvement in many people's lives. The act of sharing data is risky to
patients, whose information could end up in the hands of insurance companies that might
decide to charge more to these individuals. Furthermore, in the realm of medicine, sharing
data may be as simple as obtaining genetic information to something as complicated and
risky as participating in a drug trial. These methods of data collection could cost people their
lives, something not necessarily taken into account by statisticians and scientists collecting
information.
Imagine several drug companies are competing to develop a drug to treat a rare disease.
They each have different goals they would like to achieve with their treatment and can
evaluate and tune their methodology through data collection from patients. These patients in
turn could be incentivized to share their information in some way, but must be compensated
for possible risks to their well being. In this case, we may design a system similar to the
one discussed above in which the marketplace provides a matching between patients and
drug manufacturers upon the stipulation that expected harm patients is commensurately
compensated. This highlights the importance of the feedback between sharing data and
13
future costs, and how such feedback must be accounted for in valuing data. The value of
data and information is not limited to training algorithms. In fact, data gives agents the
ability to assess the current state a game in order to choose their action.
Example 3
Consider the following game. There exists firms fi,..., fa, each with functions TJ that map
data to utility. Additionally, there exist m sources of data, Si, ... , Sm, such that each Si is
a collection of datasets Ujdij. Firms fi may choose to buy data from each source meaning
they sample some dataset from these collections. Suppose at each step they can sample or
not sample from each source. Multiple sampling from the same source is not allowed. Each
firm has past information about the sources of information encoded in the function Gi(K)
that gives the expected value, in terms of the utility given by Fi, of buying data from a
subset of sources nI {S1, ..., Sm}. Sampling from Si comes at a price pi, where p = {Pi} is
the vector of all such prices. Given p and g, each firm calculates which sources to sample
from by optimizing: rai(p, !9) argmax 9i(k) - 1 p3 . Now, the if we imagine the subsets
KC{Si,..Sm} jEK
themselves operating as autonomous agents attempting to collect as much profit as possible,
each source of data Sj will perform the optimization (where cj is the cost of producing the
data set.) max E pj
A Nash equilibrium in this game would consist of a set of prices p such that no one source
Si has an incentive to change their price. It is unclear, without knowing the structure of the
functions gi and by extension rj(p, !9), whether or not such equilibria exist, whether or not
they are unique and finally whether they can be calculated. It stands to reason however, if
such an equilibrium p can be found, that this represents one interpretation of the value of
data. Note that this could be generalized such that the function F maps data to an estimate
of some state Oj, which in turn dictates the action ai and subsequent utility ui of firm fi. In
this case, all of this information would give fi the ability to update 9i over time as data is
collected.
1.2 Previous Work
Scoring Rules
Buying, selling and valuing information and data has been studied in several contexts in
the past. In the 1950's, weather stations discovered that they needed a way to incentivize
forecasters to provide accurate predictions [1]. This problem is not limited meteorology [2].
In fact, a large number of problems in statistics attempt to estimate the distribution of a
given random variable. Probabilistic forecasting is central in both finance and economics.
Development of Markov chain Monte Carlo methods [31 dramatically increased the value
of such methods. In order to estimate such distributions however, one must first collect
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and aggregate information from sources of information and belief. For example, a weather
station might collect information from a variety of different forecasters, aggregate it, and
publish a forecast based upon the result of this procedure. The question then becomes how
to get good information. In mathematical terms, suppose there is a risk-neutral agent who
holds a belief, in this case represented by a probability distribution P = {pi} over a set of
r states, such that Pi = 1. If one were attempting to use this agent's information along
with others to assess the true distribution of a variable, one could offer a reward to this
agent for reporting a distribution R which we would hope equals P. To encourage both
truthful reporting and incentivize good forecasting, the reward c for the agent's reported
distribution {ri} = R, would have the form c = Zpisi(P) > 0 where the function si, called
a scoring rule, is constructed such that c is maximized when R = P and P = P where P is
the true distribution of the variable in question. Hence, this value c attempts to ascribe a
value of the information or belief provided, depending on both its truthfulness and accuracy.
Brier [1] introduced the first such scoring rule as si = ai + b 2r - E r which was later
\ k /
refined by Good [41 to the logarithmic rule si = ai + blog(ri). While these scoring rules give
a good way to describe the value of certain types of data, they run into the problem that,
when aggregating data in most cases the output distribution is equal to one of the inputs
[51, called the dictator, meaning that the information provided by other agents was not a
posteriori useful. Modern results in scoring rules [6], [71, [8] demonstrate how the convexity
of such rules can guarantee truthfulness in a wide variety of situations and additionally that
different estimable values can be properly predicted using the theory of elicitible functionals.
While interesting and useful from the perspective of designing a fair market, these results
don't consider the economic aspects of data.
Active Learning
The problem of sampling informative, and possibly costly, data is the guiding principle
behind active learning. Problems here can be categorized as either stream based or pool-
based depending on the manner in which new data can be obtained. In the stream based
case, the learner is presented with one piece of data to label or not to label at each time in
the process. The active learning algorithm then provides a suggestion, based upon observed
properties of the data, whether or not it is worth labeling. The algorithm employed must
hence take in the observed properties of data and output an estimate of how valuable it
will be to the learning task. These problem and algorithms have good performance both
empirically and theoretically [9], [101, [11]. Pool-based learning [121 takes the approach that
most instances of unlabeled data are known to the learner at each time who then must
pick the best data to label given past information. Specifically, in the pool-based case, the
learner is presented with a set of labeled data, here denoted as DL = {( 1, ... , (Xn, Yn)
and unlabeled data Du = {1x, ... , xmu}, where y is the associated label to the point xi. We
15
assume the total set D = DL U De, is sampled independently and identically from the same
distribution. The learner then uses the labeled points to train an algorithm f and faces the
objective of learning points in D, in order to improve the algorithm's performance. These
problems generally feature a small labeled set and a much larger unlabeled set from which
to choose points to label. With a small budget to query the unlabeled points, the challenge
is to extract as much information from the unknown set as possible while staying within
budget constraints.
Results in pool-based active learning focus mainly on measures that indicate which un-
known point to learn. Such measures can be considered to be functions that estimate the
value of previously unlearned data. Lewis and Gale [13] developed uncertainty sampling,
labeling the data point that maximizes uncertainty while Tong and Koller [141 applied this
notion to SVM's by sampling points based upon their distance to the boundary of the clas-
sifier. Uncertainty sampling is in fact a broad term for a variety of different metrics used to
guide active learning.
Another direction of research in this area is representative sampling. Here researchers
attempt to find a measure of how representative a certain unknown data type is of the
distribution in question thereby avoiding outliers. In the case of a linear classifier, there may
be a point that is far away from the bulk of the rest of the data but happens to be close to the
decision boundary, in which case, learning the type of this point is not very useful to classify
the rest of the data accurately. Nguyen and Smeulders [151 and Donmez, Carbonell, and
Bennett [161 show how points near the boundary of this linear classification problem are more
representative if they are more tightly clustered. Clustering among data points is another
method often used in determining the representativeness of a point. Specifically, if data is
unlabeled and belongs to a tight cluster, it generally serves as a good representative of said
cluster and labeling such a point will have broader accuracy improvements. Several papers
recently [17], and [18] show that different approaches to clustering can identify the best
points to learn. In essence, active learning depends on estimating the value of incorporating
different pieces of data into a learning task.
Algorithmic Game Theory
This problem relies heavily on algorithmic game theory to transform information into up-
dated beliefs and those beliefs into actions. These in turn result in economic outcomes.
There is a large body of literature on such topics (see [19], [20], [21]) and our focus will
be on different aspects of games studied in papers such as [22]. We will utilize some of
these models and results to evaluate how rational agents behave when buying and selling
information, and, additionally will after determining players' preferences, attempt to design
information sharing mechanisms that are optimal for one or both parties. Such algorithmic
mechanism design has been explored in [23]. In particular, one active area of research we
will draw upon is the field of online mechanism design, in which dynamic outcomes from a
game are used to design an economic mechanism in which some global behavioral objective
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is optimized. Algorithms and results in this field are succinctly described in [23] in which
the authors describe a theoretical framework in which an online mechanism can be achieved
in polynomial time given some reasonable assumptions on the structure of a game. Since we
are trying to optimize feedback control, it is additionally useful to consider plant dynamics
similar to those in [24] and [25]. Here the author provides an optimal bidding mechanism
for advertisements that relies on a randomized online algorithm to update its actions.
In the simplest case, information trading between two parties can be described as a
multi armed bandit problem with costly observations. The multi armed bandit problem, in
which a player has the choice of some number of of actions, each with observable rewards
given according to some unknown distribution, has been thoroughly studied in the statistical
learning theory literature [261, [27], [281. This model describes optimal decision making in
the presence of uncertainty and has applications in a variety of different domains [291 [301
[31]. It is a prototypical example of what machine learning experts term the exploration
versus exploitation trade off. Initially, when not much is known about the reward for each
action, there is an incentive to experiment with different actions to learn their underlying
return structure. At a certain point, however, one would want to use such knowledge to
pick the best action. In our case however, we consider the case in which observations, i.e.
data collection, becomes costly. Several papers recently [321, [33] and [341 have examined
this situation given some constraints on the exploration phase of the algorithm. [351 and [36]
study the case when observations have fixed costs and costs drawn from some underlying
distribution respectively. In the latter case, learning not only has to be done on the reward
distribution of each action but also on the cost distribution of observing each action's result.
In our case, instead of considering the cost of observations drawn from some distribution, we
allow this quantity to be determined as the result of game theoretic dynamics between those
sharing and those utilizing information. The question then becomes whether or not the same
techniques and algorithms can be applied in this case to efficiently solve this variation on the
multi armed bandit problem. Much of the work above describes polynomial time algorithms
that converge to optimal solutions in the case where there is only one strategic decision
maker. In our case however, the dynamics of two players trading information becomes far
more intricate. There must necessarily be considerations on learning budget, stability and
truthfulness. In [23] the authors show how truthful mechanisms can be created in an auction
type game, results we hope to apply to our information sharing mechanism.
1.3 Contributions of This Thesis
In almost every major industry, due to digitization and cheap sensors if a quantity of interest
can potentially be measured and predicted, it is. Modern computational resources and the
increasing sophistication of statistical inference algorithms has led to firms getting more
value from the data they collect. The prevalence of data sources and the increasing value
firms find in it, has led to data increasingly being viewed as an asset.
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Currently, there are gross inefficiencies in the way data is traded - both from the per-
spective of firms buying data, and vendors collecting and selling it. Firms buy data based on
intuitions on whether it might be useful in predicting trends they are interested in modeling.
For example, within financial firms there are large teams whose sole purpose is to obtain
datasets from a variety of sources to value financial instruments. Often they buy data with-
out ever having assessed its predictive quality, out of fear that all other firms are buying it
too. Even if it turns out that the data a firm buys is predictive, there is no principled method
to put a dollar value on the increase in predictive quality. Vendors (e.g. Reuters, Forrester,
Gartner), on the other hand, have no method to value the new, unique data sources in-
creasingly becoming available. Furthermore, vendors have no way of knowing which firms in
particular will find these datasets useful. Hence, they keep selling the same type of datasets
they have been selling for years to same set of companies leading to is firms and vendors
locked in long-term contracts for the same dataset. Given the nature of data-driven decision
making, if vendors cannot make informed decisions of what data to collect and who to sell
it to, it will lead to less predictive models. Our goal is to create a valuation system, or data
marketplace, in which data can be bought and sold.
The increasing use of data
in modern society is an in-
How do a guarantee firms
......... tevitable product of recent
.. s ttechnological advances. From
the perspective of those us-
ing the data, new algorithms
Prediction Goals
Value of Accuracy and computers have been huge
Data Set
in advancing their goals, but
ero edcl o a. w alociate o
". -ed .. * ...... revenuetovendws?: the current process of learn-
Data Allocation Marketplace
Compnsation For Data ing is becoming hopelessly in-
..a.....ata..........efficient. One of the rea-
Car. a data aikxafian
Value of Data be cal.cUalted Jefrtly? sons big data is catching on
... is because it is designed to
lcion ne deal with huge quantities of
data through techniques like
dimension reduction. How-
Figure 1-3: A Data Marketplace. ever, as powerful as dimension
reduction is, at a certain point
these firms must face the fact that they will no longer be able to collect an huge amount
of complex data and conclude something useful, rather they will need to shift to collecting
useful data in a more targeted way. Our system is designed to do just that. Firms who
participate will be guaranteed to only receive data that is most useful to their objective,
disregarding other information that could be misleading or repetitive. Additionally, while
they will pay some fee to collect this information, it will be small compared to the effort
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required to sift through all the data available to find data they need. Firms also sometimes
require information that is difficult to collect either due to privacy concerns, lack of sources
or some other complication. In this case, offering a financial incentive to share information
in a fair market will make sources of rare data less reticent in releasing their information,
increasing the possibilities for firms.
From the individual's perspective, the current system of data acquisition completely dis-
regards our right to privacy. If Google or Equifax or the government can collect information
on anyone's preferences and beliefs at their leisure, the social ramifications could be catas-
trophic and we are already seeing a push towards regulations on privacy. However, a push
towards what? It is not as if the economy, which subsists on data, will stop collecting our
information. What is needed is a systematic way that data and information can be shared
such that all parties benefit. The results proposed in this paper would be such a system.
Upon adoption of such a system, we foresee the following societal benefits:
" Useful data would be more available to those who need it, streamlining learning.
" Individual privacy would be protected.
" There would exist a systematic, unified method to value information.
Apart from the considerable social impact solving this problem will have, there are some
fascinating and fundamental technical challenges that need to be tackled along the way, that
make this endeavor especially exciting. First, how many times should a vendor replicate a
dataset to maximize revenue? - Data shares similarities with digital goods (e.g. songs, mobile
apps) where the marginal cost of production is zero. However unlike other digital goods, it
is realistic for a firm to derive most of its value from a dataset due to exclusive access, and so
replicating data and making it less scarce can severely affect its market value; Second, unlike
other economic assets, the value of data to a firm cannot be assessed a priori; the value of data
is derived solely from its ability to predict a quantity of interest. In addition, valuations for
datasets are inherently combinatorial in nature and given the potential scale of this problem,
it is infeasible for any mechanism to go through every possible combination of datasets when
matching firms and vendors. Hence any mechanism not only has to match firms and vendors,
it must efficiently and accurately assess the predictive quality of various combinations of
dataset with respect to the quantities firms are interested in. No mechanism currently used
has this capability. Solving either problem above would be a significant technical milestone
in of itself, and both are vital in achieving the vision of a data marketplace.
This thesis seeks to make the most general system possible, however, as previously men-
tioned, it is not possible to quantify the value of data without considering the application
domain. For example, information on financial assets might be both structured and valued in
a vastly different ways from data on medical procedures. With that said, we think that there
are huge possibilities for this technology in the domains of medicine, finance and insurance.
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Data is integral to every decision a firm takes. Thus, firms and vendors must value data
very carefully. Understanding the fundamental economic forces governing data exchange is
an important problem. We hope change how data is traded, away from long-term contracts
between the same set of firms and vendors to a more robust data allocation mechanism. This
will ensure that firms that derive the most value from a dataset are the ones that get it,
and vendors are incentivized to collect unique, predictive datasets. In addition, given how
sensitive of a topic privacy has become, only by accurately assessing how valuable the data
of an individual is, can we have a rigorous discussion on what data is worth collecting in
addition to ensuring that individuals that choose to provide their data are fairly paid for it.
To date, there has been no attempt to create a system to fairly value and trade data. Such a
system could be applied in a variety of fields from finance and e-commerce to medicine and
advertising.
1.3.1 Outline
The structure of the thesis is as follows: in Chapter 2, we introduce the mathematical
preliminaries necessary for the analysis and design of data marketplaces. We also introduce
several different methods of both valuing and trading data, and discuss their relation to
previous work done in combinatorial auctions and algorithmic game theory. In Chapter
3, we develop a method with which to price data to optimize total learning under certain
restrictions on learning. Chapter 4 describes an integer programming formulation of our
problem and novel relaxations and approximations we may use to solve it. Chapter 5 gives a
framework for a profit maximizing data allocation mechanism. We discuss several directions
for future work and conclude in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we provide the mathematical background that will allow us to value data. It
is divided into three main sections: the first section is devoted to machine learning, especially
to highlight several algorithms and results in supervised learning. In particular, metrics for
measuring error in machine learning will be important in quantifying the value of data, and
hence will be covered; the second section covers several major results in algorithmic game
theory, focusing in general on mechanism design, combinatorial auctions and associated
algorithms; finally, the third section gives a model for the data valuation problem along with
preliminary results.
2.1 Machine Learning
In "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" [37], Alan Turing posed the question "Can
machines think?" or rather "Can machines do what we can do." This idea was formalized
by Tom Mitchel who said "A computer program is said to learn from experience E with
respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P if its performance at tasks in
T, as measured by P, improves with experience E." This is precisely the goal of machine
learning: to provide a computer some experience and use that to learn to do some assigned
job better. Machine learning makes data driven predictions or decisions by building a model
from input. Applications of this technology are pervasive in the modern world. We find
machine learning software reading handwriting [381, identifying spam [39], characterizing
social networks, recognizing faces among many other applications. There is currently great
excitement in academia and society regarding the possibilities of such technology. However,
there are reasons to temper our expectations. Pattern recognition, which lies at the heart
of all machine learning problems, is highly nontrivial. It is easy for example, to come to
the wrong conclusions given limited or faulty data, as Microsoft learned in 2016 with their
chatbot fiasco [40]. Furthermore, current research on the brain suggests that the ways we
process data and the way a computer functions are vastly different, so trying to obtain
human-type cognition from a machine is probably unreasonable.
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With those caveats in place, machine learning has also made great strides in recent
years. From Google's reinforcement learning algorithm mastering the notoriously difficult
game 'Go', to the emergence of self driving cars, machine learning and artificial intelligence
are becoming commonplace in modern life. Machine learning can be separated into several
different types of tasks. Supervised learning, unsupervised learning and reinforcement learn-
ing. For the most part, this thesis will focus on supervised learning tasks, however, it is
useful to understand the flavor of the other two topics as well.
2.1.1 Supervised Learning
Example 1. Let's consider a fictional email service, "Fahoo," that must design a method for
identifying spam emails. Mathematically this means constructing a function f : R' - {S, N}
that maps the vectorized description of some email to "spam" (S) or "not spam" (N). To
do this, we have access to a set of pre-classified emails {(e1, c), (e 2 , c2 ), ... , (ek, ck)} with
which we can test and tune our function f. For this example we will gloss over exactly how
emails are turned into vectors e1 except to say that these vectors are called "features" and the
associated ci E {S, N} are called their "labels." From this information Fahoo must decide,
given some new email e E Rin, whether e is spam or not.
The above example is a classic problem in supervised learning. An algorithm is presented
with a set of inputs with which it can learn a function f in order to accomplish a task (in this
case identifying spam). Supervised learning tasks fall into two main categories: classification
and regression. A classification task asks the machine categorize data into a finite number of
categories. This could be binary classification such as the spam example above, or it could
be something more complicated like identifying a handwritten letter which would belong
to a set of size 26. In regression, the prediction can range over a continuous set of values.
Examples of a problem in regression might be predicting the rainfall for the next day given
current meteorological measurements. In either case, the essence of the problem is to take
input data {(ei, ci), (e 2 , c 2 ), ... , (ek, ck)}, process this data using an algorithm, and return a
function f which makes predictions f(e) = c.
At its heart, supervised learning is an optimization problem. In the spam example above
we would like to design a function f that mistakes as few inputs as possible. To do so, we
might define an error function error(f) = n1 f(e2 )#c where lf(e)c, is an indicator function.
Anywhere the function f makes a mistake is penalized by the error function. In general,f belongs to a class of functions parametrized by a E R' such that the machine learning
algorithm must now solve the optimization problem min error(f). A classic example of this
might be, if e E R2 to take a linear function f(x, a) = a1X 1 + a 2x 2 . This may seem like a
restrictive class of functions to consider, however, it can give astonishingly accurate results,
particularly when combined with the kernel methods. It is important to note that different
algorithms can be trained using different error functions with different results. In general,
error functions that are nice, e.g. linear or convex, functions of the parameters a provide
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nice algorithmic solutions, however, as we will see, this is not always possible.
One problem in supervised learning is that, once given a labeled data set
{(el, c1), (e2 , c2 ), ---, (ek, Ck)}, the algorithm should avoid overfitting. It could be the case that
the function we design f works perfectly on the input data
{ (e 1, c1), (e2 , c 2 ), ---, (ek, Ck)}, but not well on unknown inputs. We need the function f to
generalize well. There are many methods to design such functions, but, without new data,
we must have a way to test how well our function f might behave on unknown data. Do do
this we employ a common tool in machine learning and statistics known as cross validation.
This technique, in essence, chooses a subset S of our training data { (es1 , csl), ... , (es,, cs)},
uses this subset as the input to our chosen algorithm to design fs, and then tests the error
of fs on the remainder of the training data. If we do this procedure repeatedly we can
measure how well our algorithm does creating functions that generalize well. We will use
similar techniques later on to determine the value of data and information to different tasks.
Another difficulty faced by supervised learning is that there is no limit to how large or
complex the data can be. Often times this makes it necessary for a preliminary algorithm to
transform the data initially before it can be used to train the learning task. Such transforma-
tions could come in the form of dimension reduction, Fourier and Laplace transformations,
or other methods, depending on the domain. Consider genetic data. The complexity of DNA
and the human genome might mean that this information could belong to large dimensional
Euclidean space and it is generally difficult to design efficient, meaningful algorithms that
make predictions in R".
Thankfully, as many modern results
like the Johnson-Lindenstrauss theorem
show, high dimensional data can be pro-
jected onto much smaller subspaces with-
out losing too much information. In the
following we give an example of how such
dimension reduction techniques can be
employed to preprocess data.
Example 2. A study in 2008 by Amer-
ican and Swiss researchers led by John
Novembre at UCLA [41] examined how
human genetics relate geographically with
one another. They collected blood from
over 1, 300 individuals from three dozen
countries across the whole of Europe.
Each of these samples was a 200, 000 di-
mensional vector vi E R2 00 ' represent-
ing single nucleotide polymorphisms, es-
-.
Figure 2-1: Genes Mirror Geography.
sentially places in human DNA that commonly differ between populations. Doing analysis in
200,000 dimensional space is difficult and the researchers wanted a way to somehow visualize
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their results. To do this they collected the column vectors {vi} into a matrix A, and then
decomposed A into its singular value decomposition A = UDVT. Then, defining the first two
columns of U as u1 , u2 they calculated U2UDV T where U2 = [U1, U2]'. Using the well known
result from linear algebra that states that this projection optimally preserves variance of the
columns of A, this process resulted in a 2 dimensional vector i for each individual. That
amounts to a dimension reduction from 200, 000 dimensions to 2 dimensions. Incredibly,
when the new values iU were plotted in R2, seen in Figure 2-1, they exactly mirrored the
geographical locations of each sample. This is simply one example of the usefulness of pre-
processing and the necessity of finding the critical components of data. Had the researchers
really tried to do analysis with the original A, they would have been sunk.
There are numerous different methods for supervised learning, all of which will be com-
patible with the data marketplace we design, however we will discuss two examples that
highlight some important algorithmic problems and properties.
Support Vector Machines
Imagine we have a binary classification task such that we would like to have a function
f : R" - {-1, 1} where f(x) classifies the feature vector x E Rn as belonging to one group
or another. One method we might use to do this is called linear classification. Specifically,
this method says to parametrize the class of functions f(x) we want to pick from by a
vector a c R+1 such that f(x) = sgn (an+1 + i aixi). The function an+1 + Z a simply
describes a hyperplane in n dimensional space which classifies points based on which "side"
they happen to fall on. Now suppose we have a set of
such that xi c R" and yj E {-1, 1}.
Given this, we would like to choose the optimal
vector a such that f makes the fewest mistakes pos-
sible on the training set. To this end, we might pe-
nalize the function f(x, a) as we did before, by adding
a penalty of one for every misclassified example, how-
ever, this approach has several problems. First of all,
the loss function is discontinuous and hard to optimize,
and second, there could be an infinite number of so-
called separating hyperplanes that properly classify the
data we are provided with. How should we choose one?
For these reasons, we would rather consider the loss
k n
function-, (max{0, 1- yj(an+1 + E aj)}I +Aara.
This gives us the ability to both create a maximally
separating hyperplane and to deal with training data that is not linearly separable. At this
point, we solve for a using dual convex programming. The dual problem, which relies only
labeled points {(xi, yi), ... , (X,, yk)}
-4 -2 0 2
Figure 2-2: Linear Classifier.
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on the inner product of the feature vectors, can be manipulated so that we may take non-
linear mappings # : R' -* R', apply these to our initial features, and solve the problem in
the higher dimensional linear space. Such methods are known as kernel methods and are
used extensively. SVMs are but one example of a method of training classifiers, however,
in most cases these methods follow the same principles: There is some class of functions f
parametrized by a. Given some labeled data {(Xi, yi), ... , (X,, Yk)} and some loss function,
we minimize the loss over the labeled data with respect to a to estimate the true classifier.
Neural Networks
Another interesting class of learning algorithms are known as neural networks. Pioneered in
the 1950's and inspired by rudimentary models of the brain, they remained largely forgotten
until modern computing power allowed it to reach its full potential.
Neural networks are simply functions f : R' - R'. What makes them special is that,
given any other function g : R" - R', we can design a neural network to give us f that
approximates g arbitrarily well. This means that even tw
2-3 can be correctly classified by these methods.
A neural network is a directed graph with nodes and
edges consisting of several different components. The
first component is the input layer, a set of n nodes,
the output layer, a set of m nodes, and some number of
hidden layers each with an unspecified number of nodes.
Each of these layers are connected to subsequent layers
by a number of weighted edges wij, beginning with the
input, then hidden, then output layers. Nodes in the
network take in a sum, weighted by the strength wij
of incoming edges, of outputs Ai in the previous layer.
This sum is then fed into a function 0 : R -* R such that
the output of node j becomes O(9j + E wijAi) where
the weights wij and the offsets 6O are all parameters the
learning algorithm can adjust. Common functions used
o sets such as those seen in Figure
0 ?)
-0 6
Figure 2-3: Difficult Classification
for 0 are sigmoid functions, step
functions, or any other function that approximates some sort of threshold. Now, given some
set of labeled data {(Xi, yi), ... , (Xk, Yk)} where xi E R" and yi E R' we can use an algorithm
known as backpropegation to adjust the weights and offsets so that f correctly classifies
training data. The backpropegation algorithm is just clever differentiation in combination
with gradient descent. Any neural network made up of more than one hidden layer is known
as a deep neural network and if can be shown that any function can be arbitrarily well
approximated by three hidden layers of arbitrary size.
In each of the problems above, it was assumed that the algorithm was provided with
labeled training data. This doesn't account for the problem that useful data is often scarce,
noisy and costly to collect. Machine learning algorithms that factor this constraint into their
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methodologies are called active learning methods. They are particularly important to our
work as they focus on only collecting data of the highest quality. This means that by defining
a value for data will place this class of algorithms on solid footing, which until now operate
mainly based on heuristic estimates of what is "good" data.
Active Learning
Any supervised learning algorithm, including the ones discussed above, rely on previously
labeled data. If there is no data to tell a neural network what outputs should be associated
with different inputs, you might as well just throw a dart at a board for all the predictive
value the function will have. For this reason, data is incredibly important to all of these
learning tasks. However, data and information can be both difficult and costly to obtain.
Active learning is a subfield of supervised learning that attempts to develop algorithms which
take this cost into account. Suppose that we are conducting a study on sexually transmitted
diseases in a population of college students. Perhaps our goal is to predict the likelihood a
student with particular features and behavior has of coming down with a given infection.
To do this, we would need to collect some data on students that both have and don't have
the ailment in question. However, due to the sensitivity of such information, subjects would
both have a tendency to either lie or not report at all. To encourage them to report their
feature xi E Rn and their status yi E {-1, 1} (infected or not) we as researchers could
offer a financial incentive for truthful reports. As researchers, we have a limited budget
so we would like to build the most accurate classifier possible while minimizing the money
spent on data. Classic approaches to this problem generally obtain data that is the most
uncertain to the classifier. In the case of a support vector machine, this might mean labeling
feature vectors that lie closest to the separating hyperplane previously given by our learning
algorithm. Other variations on this idea include choosing to label data points that, in
expectation, improve the performance our algorithm. Specifically, suppose we have some
supervised learning algorithm A that takes in some training set {(Xi, yi), ... , (Xk, Yk)} and
produces a function f(x) E [0, 1]2 representing the probability of x being in one category or
the other. Suppose further that there is an error function E(f, {(XI, yi), ... , (Xk, Yk)}) such
that f satisfies f = argmin E(g, {(XI, y1), ... , (Xk, yA)}). Now, given this, suppose there exists
g
unlabeled data {w1 , ... , w1} such that, if the true label of wi is ui, the total error changes by
6(wi , u) = E(f, {(xi, y1), ... , (Xk, yk)}) - E(f, {(x1, y), ... , (k, yk), (wi, ui)}). Then we can
choose the data point wi that, in expectation f(wi) 1 6(wi, 1) + f(wi) 26(wi, -1) improves the
performance of the algorithm the most.
Two other important branches of machine learning are unsupervised learning and rein-
forcement learning. Unsupervised learning takes unlabeled input {X 1 , ... , Xn} and tries to
associate with those points some sort of structure. Clustering is a popular tool used for
this purpose and a variety of different problems in network analysis and other fields require
machines to "learn" about unlabeled data. Reinforcement learning tries to update some
learning function f from data that is fed back into the system as a result of decisions made
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from previous functions f. A classic example of this is the lauded multi-armed bandit prob-
lem which, in its simplest form, states that a gambler has access to m arms a1 , ... , a, each
paying 1 with probability pi and 0 with probability 1 - pi. The objective of the gambler is
to, while playing, identify which arm is best. A classic solution to this problem dictates that
one should choose an arm ai at time t with probability ewi (t) where w (t) is the number of
E ewi (t)
wins of arm aj at time t. Over time this policy converges to the optimal policy with bounded
regret.
2.2 Algorithmic Game Theory
In their pivotal paper [42], Nisan and Ronen pointed out a growing need to consider al-
gorithmic problems in distributed settings with self interested agents. The most obvious
example of such a setting is the internet, in which countless selfish agents interact at all
times. Current research in this field focuses on the stability and computability of equilibria
as well as the efficiency, in terms of the price of anarchy of such distributed systems. Sev-
eral different economic applications to this work are gaining importance including complex
auctions, targeted advertisement, and a variety of other multi-agent systems. We will draw
mainly on the ideas of mechanism design and in particular auction theory as they relate to
our learning problem.
2.2.1 Mechanism Design
A blend of economics, game theory and engineering, mechanism design analyzes strategic in-
teraction by designing mechanisms to incentivize players to cooperate for a global objective.
In mechanism design problems, games are played by agents that have particular types. Let
0. E e, denote the type of the ith agent from the total set of possibilities E8. Then, given an
outcome of the game o c 0, the utility of each agent can be expressed in terms of a function
parametrized by their type. In mathematical terms, if agent i has type 0, G E , and o E 0
is the outcome of the game, the utility they receive is ui(o, Of). Agents, or players, then have
a set of strategies or actions si(Oi) E Ei they can take to effect the outcome of the game. In
addition to playing a single one of these actions, we may consider mixed strategies, where
agents play distributions over the set Ei representing the probability they play particular
actions. The utility of each agent can be rewritten as a function ui(o(s 1 , s2, ... , sn), 02) de-
pending on their type and the other players' actions, where o(si, S2, ... , sn) is the outcome of
the game depending on the strategy profile of all the players participating.
Definition 3. A strategy profile (S1, s2,..., sn) is called a Nash equilibrium if every agent max-
imizes their expected utility so that for each i we have u2 (o(si, s-i), Oi) ;> ui o(si, s-i), Of), Vsi
si
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Although the idea of the Nash equilibrium is central to game theory, it makes excessively
strong assumptions about agents' information about other players. Additionally, there are
sometimes multiple equilibria. Various different extensions of this idea have been proposed
to solve these issues. Dominant strategy equilibria feature agents who have one strategy
that outperforms all others regardless of the other players' actions. In addition there are
mixed Nash equilibria and Bayesian Nash equilibria which both behave better than pure
Nash equilibria.
Mechanism design is often concerned with dominant strategy equilibria. Consider auction
design. The standard problem states that there is some object for sale, and agents a1 , ... ,a,
who would like to buy the object. Each agent has their own valuation vi, ... , va, for the object
and therefore would not like to spend any more than that to obtain it. The problem is to
allocate the object to the person who values the object the most. One idea to consider would
be to collect how much each agent says they value the object, i, ... , v~, (these are known as
the bids) and give the object to the agent with the greatest valuation Fi5 for the price Ui7.
However, this doesn't work, since agents may lie about their valuations in order to increase
their utility. Specifically, if the winning agent decreases their bid Ui by e, as long as the bids
are reasonable space, he will increase his utility by E, so there is an incentive to lie. Enter
the Vickrey auction, the cornerstone of mechanism design and truthful mechanisms. The
Vickrey auction, also known as a second price auction, determines that the agent with the
highest bid ji is allocated the object for a price of zFj where 17j is the second highest bid. In
this case, if the winning agent changes their bid up or down a small amount, they do not
change their utility, unless they drop too far and lose the object entirely, going from positive
utility to zero utility. Hence, the winning player has no incentive to lie. If the other players
lie, they either continue not to get the object, or get it at too high a price. The structure
is elegant in its simplicity and many results in mechanism design were either inspired by or
simplify to this kind of mechanism.
Mechanism design, in its simplest form, consists of a social choice function f : 0 1 x ... x
E) -- 0 that describes the best outcome for set a players with different types. A mechanism
M =( 1 , ... , En, g(e)) defines the set of strategies available to each player and a rule g(o)
that describes the outcome of each action profile. A mechanism defines the actions available
and the outcomes based on those actions.
Definition 4. We say that a mechanism M implements the social choice function f(0) if,
at equilibrium, the outcome predicted by the social choice function is also the outcome at
equilibrium of the mechanism.
Many mechanisms such as auctions rely on agents to report their types 6, 8E such that
f(6) = o E 0 is the optimal social outcome.
Definition 5. Mechanisms that feature dominant strategies that are truthful are called "truth-
ful".
The Vickrey auction discussed above is the prototypical example of a truthful mechanism
since a simple payoff rule incentivizes agents to report their true value for an object. In later
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sections, our goal will be to design rules for allocating goods and money such that all parties
involved in a transaction are incentivized to reveal their true type.
2.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions
It is important to take a closer look at a particular brand of mechanism design known as
combinatorial auctions before we delve more deeply into the problem of valuing data. The
purpose of an auction like the second price auction discussed above, is to allocate a good in
the most socially optimal way possible. It can be shown that the Vickrey mechanism does
just this, by both incentivizing bidders to reveal their true valuations and by giving the object
to that agent who values it most. While this is fine when considering selling a single good
or service, more complicated auctions might not yield such an elegant result. In particular,
auctions involving the sale of a variety of distinct assets pose several interesting challenges
to the mechanism designer. First of all, because of complementaries and substitution effects
between different goods being sold, bidders have valuations and preferences over subsets of
goods. This means that economic efficiency is improved as long as bidders may place offers
on subsets of goods. Auctions with this structure are known as combinatorial auctions and
are becoming more and more important in the 21st century. Examples of combinatorial
auctions include the FFC spectrum auction, auctions for airport time slots [43], and delivery
routes [44].
These are auctions in which there are n agents as usual ai, ... , a, however, instead of
bidding on one object, there are multiple objects 01, ... , Ok available. Furthermore, the value
of an allocation of objects 01, .. , Ok to player ai is not linear in the objects. In mathematical
terms this means that Vi(01,..., Ok) # Vi(o, ..., ok_1) + Vi(ok), where V(9) gives the value
of a subset of objects to agent ai, and therefore objects may be worth more when paired
with other objects. As an example of this one can think of the body of a vehicle and its
engine as two objects. Separately they may have low value, but together they have value
greater than the sum of their parts. For this reason agents release valuations or bids on
subsets of objects and the auction designer must come up with a way to distribute money
and objects in such a way that buyers and sellers alike are incentivized to participate fairly.
Due to this, bidders must transmit some description of their bids for each subset of items
being sold, a computationally complex task. Thus, the bidder must calculate its utility for
each of m! different subsets, and then transmit this as an exponentially long vector to the
auctioneer. It is clear that this isn't efficient or even feasible as m grows. Many solutions
to this problem including bidding languages [451, oracle submission [461, and other bidding
restrictions 147] have been proposed. It is well known that this problem is NP-complete in
the worst case, however, in recent years several different methods to approximate optimal
solutions have been proposed. We can write the problem of multi unit combinatorial auctions
as the following integer program.
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nmax E 1 Vi(S)y(Si) (2.1)
i=1 SCM
s.t. Ey (s, Zi) < k Vj E f{I, ... , m}
SjyES i=1
Zy(S, i)1 Vic{1,...,rn} (2.2)
SCM
y(Si) E {O, 1}
The constraint y(S, i) 0 {, 1} can be relaxed to y(S, i) E [0, 1] in order to utilize tools
from linear programming. Solutions that result from this relaxation may be useful to estimate
optimal allocations of goods, and may additionally give information in terms of the dual of
the problem. Finally, some work has been done analyzing incentive compatible or truthful
mechanisms to elicit bids from participants in such an auction. The classic example of this
is the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism which is truthful provided optimal solutions
to the above integer program can be solved exactly. As this is often intractable, some
researchers have proposed other forms of mechanisms.
2.3 Valuing Data
The purpose of this thesis is to define the value of a piece of data, and describe a method
through which it can be sold. In fact these two goals are intrinsically intertwined in that the
price of data is dependent on some kind of market which in turn is impacted by the definition
of the value of data. Dynamics of buying and selling data can take many different forms and
in order to consider them in the greatest generality possible, we consider for the remainder
of this work the following situation. Suppose we have n firms fi, ... , fn who would like to buy
information and m vendors of information vi,..., v, each selling data set di, ... , din. Each of
the firms would like to estimate the state of a variable 0% E 0j, where E9 E Rk is convex
and there is a function gj(0) for each firm fi giving them some utility for their estimate of
the type 0%. These functions gj(0) are maximized when 0 is the true state 0%. Each firm has
previous information Ei(t) at time t and an algorithm Ai : I x d :- 0, that uses previous
information and some subset d E {d, ... , d,} to update the firm's estimate of 0 to Oi. On the
other side of the transaction, the vendors vj gain utility by monetary payment from firms
for releasing data, in addition to some feedback effects bj(fi, ... , fk) based upon who gets
dataset dj. Note that vendors may replicate their data to sell it to multiple firms. Finally,
depending on the level of information of different firms, individual firms may be penalized
by the function cj(01 , ... , 0n). It is our task to come up with a good method to allocate data
to firms and choose how firms pay vendors.
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Definition 6. A data valuation game consists of the following:
1. n firms { f1, ... , f,} each having information {I1, ... ,I } who wish to estimate the state
64e E i, where Ei is convex, of some variable. Utility is gained through the function
gi(9), where 0 is the estimate of the state, such that gi(0) is globally maximized when
the estimate 0 is equal to the true state Oi. Finally, each firm has an algorithm Ai that
takes in -1i and some datasets {dil, ... , dik} that produces a new estimate of the state
6'. Finally, there is a function for each firm representing competition between firms
ci(01, ... , ,) so that the total utility of the firm fi is equal to gi (0) + ci (01, .,-i) minus
what they pay for the data they buy.
2. The information parametrizing the firms gives them utility for each set of data S
{ dil, ... , dik} denoted V(S).
3. There are m data vendors {v1, ... , vm} selling data sets {d1 , ... , dm} such that the utility
from a transaction is decomposed into the monetary payment, pj, and the feedback effect
bj (f1, ... , fj,) that occurs as the result of selling information dj to the firms f31,..., fi,.
To sort through all of the notation introduced above, it is useful to consider an example:
Example 7. Consider the problem of a ride sharing service like Lyft or Uber trying to
estimate the future demand for service at a specific time and a specific place. To make this
estimate they will need to collect historical data on users' past demand. Suppose, for this
example, there are two firms f1, f2 representing Lyft and Uber, who would like to estimate
the number of people 0 demanding their service on a Saturday night so that they may adjust
their prices accordingly. Each firm gains g1 (0), g2 (0) respectively from these estimates, the
more accurate the better, and hence would like to collect as much information as possible.
They must weigh this gain against the potential cost of collecting this data. Finally, they
may be penalized by a competition function ci(01, 02) dependent on both players estimates.
On the other hand, there are m users of these services who may sell their data {d1 , ... , dm}
to either (or both) firms at some set prices. Their utility is then this price plus the possible
feedback effects of sharing their data. For example, if an individual's data suggests that
their demand on Saturday will be extremely high, it is in the best interest of a ride sharing
service to increase prices at that time, since this will result in more revenue. In this case,
the information this individual shared had a direct effect on their prosperity in the future
and hence, this must be factored into their utility. In such a game, the players may decide
to buy or not buy at a particular price (in the firms case) or sell or not sell at a particular
price (in the case of the vendors.) However, without knowing how the data dj improves their
estimate, how is a firm supposed to decide what price a piece of data is worth? Conversely,
without knowing the effects of their data on the estimate 6 and the resulting feedback, how do
vendors decide at which price to sell? The inherent informational asymmetries of this game
make these tasks difficult.
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This example, and preceding definition, suggest that a third party might be necessary in
determining the optimal price to buy and sell data, since, the only way the firm can value
the data is by processing it, implying that it already received it. Additionally, the only way
to determine the feedback effects of sharing information, is to share it to find out how that
changes 9. These are both unattractive options for all parties involved, and hence, data will
be sold at far to high or far to low a price, these prices will be slow to respond to changes
in learning or data quality and total welfare will suffer. Hence, we would like to create a
mechanism that, given the information of the firms and access to the data sets, assigns an
allocation of both data and funds. In this way, it is similar to the idea of a combinatorial
auction discussed earlier with some significant variations. First of all, firms do not bid on
subsets of data, they provide their information and utility functions and the mechanism
decides how much they value these subsets; and second, the datasets can be replicated,
removing one of the more difficult constraints of the combinatorial auction problem. The
following chapter will be concerned with constructing allocations of data and wealth optimal
for all participants.
2.3.1 Individual Data Valuation
Before we develop the methods to do this however, it is necessary to discuss an firm's
data valuation. This is the quality of data we would like to describe however value is a
nebulous term. In much of the previous research on scoring rules and active learning, the
value of data is simply how it increases accuracies of prediction. In this paper, we will
often take a similar approach, but it is worth pointing out that information is only useful
in a situation where it can be exploited. If I obtain data that accurately predicts the
economic growth of Kazakhstan, this isn't useful to me unless I can use that information.
In this research we assume that data serves the following role. A firm is playing a game
with actions a E A such that, depending on the state of the game 0 E E, they receive utility
u(a, 0). The goal then, given the firm knows the true state 0*, becomes to play a that satisfies
a = argmax u(a, 0*). Before soliciting information, the firm has an estimate of 6 informed by
aEA
either past information other priors. They also have the ability to incorporate new data into
this estimate of 0 using some predetermined algorithm with the goal of improving utility.
The value of information is simply then the difference in utility with and without using the
data to estimate 0 and obtain optimal actions a E A.
This estimation of value is very dependent on the application. If we are trying to predict
the price of a particular stock 0, it is not possible to determine the utility increase of data
since we can't tell what 0 will be. One solution to this is to obtain data about past stock
prices to use current data as a predictive tool. This brings up a subtle but important
distinction in how data is used. Some data is used to train the model. In the case of a stock,
this might be historical correlations between different data and said stock. This information
is used to tune the algorithm that gives the best actions a E A possible. Additionally data
is used as a signal of the current state. In the stock pricing example, this might be current
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economic indicators or social media sentiment that we use to feed into our algorithm to give
us a. Both uses of data increase prediction accuracy, but in different ways. All this raises
the question why we don't simply just quantify value as an increase in accuracy. It could
be the case that certain mistakes still lead to the right a E A while other minor mistakes
lead to catastrophic loss in utility. So we are not only concerned with how data improves
our model, but how that model impacts utility. This distinction is not present in any of the
current literature.
We will assume for the remainder of the thesis that the system that allocates data to
firms has the ability to calculate functions Vi(S) that quantify the increase in utility of
firm fi obtaining and learning from data dj E S C {di, ... , dm1. Additionally, as competition
between firms and feedback from data to vendors is difficult to model and analyze, we assume
that the functions V represent only the value firm fi gets, and the vendors are simply paid
some profit. We include an example before moving onto the next chapter.
A Hidden Markov Model
Suppose we are a financial firm tracking the price xt of an asset over time. We assume
that this asset's price is described by some m state hidden Markov model. At the outset,
we have a set of priors on the transition probabilities, in the model which we would like to
update using past observations. We also have access to historical prices. Observations in
this case can be bought at some price pi. Given no observations, all we have is the historical
prices, and hence, can calculate the estimated distribution of prices at time m. Ideally, we
would like to get all observations yo, ... , yn- so that we can get an accurate estimate of
P(xilyi). If we can get such an estimate, and our previous knowledge of the Markov model
gives us P(xmi, xr) then if we can obtain observation yin, we should be able to accurately
estimate the future price xm. Depending on the prices of the past observations and the states
... X_ 1 , X0 , X 1 , ... , Xrm , it should be optimal to get some subset of observations yi, -- , y.-, to
train the model.
Then, getting yin gives us a signal about the future value we want to predict. This
illustrates the multifaceted uses of data, both as a training tool and as an indicator of the
current state. Now, assume that the utility of our firm is described by --(I0x - XM 11) 2
where Xm is our estimate of the future stock price. In this case, since we do not yet have
access to the value x,, what we may do to estimate the value of getting some observations
ys for S C [m] would be to first get an estimate of Yi, for all i E S without using any
observations, then train the model using the data ys to get new observations Yi'. Then
we can measure the difference in utility both learning and not learning the data by taking
V(y,) = -(IIX - y,'I1) 2 + (I1X, - ZI11) 2 . Then, this should give some estimate of the
iES
value of the subset ys C {-.., Y-1, Yo, .. , Ym-i1}. Finally in order to assess the value of the
current observation yi, we use the model, trained using ys, and measure the increase in
utility over time both with and without current observations. In other words, we take
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V(ym) = -(xi - yi'|I)2+ (|1 x - YilI)2 where Yi' is the value of xi estimated by
\iES
the trained model with observation yi, and Yj is the estimate without this observation.
Hence, the total value of learning subset ys U
ym becomes simply the sum of their two values Simulated Valuation Function
V(ys U ym) = V(ys) + V(ym). Note that all of
these values can be calculated empirically and 1.2,3,4
* .398
give an estimate of the increase in utility of the
firm by learning data.
Simulations
Simulations using a similar model and four
data sets demonstrate that, while initially, data
largely improves estimation, additional informa-
tion has decreasing, or even possibly negative,
marginal returns. This is seen in Figure 2-4
where the Hasse Diagram of the partially ordered
set defined by inclusion of subsets of all data
{di, d2 , d3 , d4 } is labeled with the accuracy im-
provements achieved by learning the data corre-
sponding to each node. It is clear that as we look
higher in the graph, and therefore learn more
data, the accuracy improves.
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Figure 2-4: Simulated Valuation Function
This is further seen in figure 2-5 where
he values {V(0), V(di), V(di U d 2 ), K(di U
2 U d3), V(di U d2 U d3 U d4 )} are plotted
r several different V functions. These dif-
erent Vi's were generated by allowing each
gent fi access to different prior information.
is easily seen though that in general, learn-
ig follows an increasing, subadditive trend.
Figure 2-5: Comparison of Different Valuation Func-
tions
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Chapter 3
Data Matchings
3.1 Data Matching Mechanisms
In the previous chapter, we defined the problem faced by a mechanism designer valuing and
selling data. In this section, we will describe several methods to allocate data that guarantee
truthfulness given some structure on data and learning. We later develop and analyze an
algorithm to find optimal matchings.
Definition 8. In a data valuation game, the outcome of playing is called an allocation and
can be represented by sets S1, ... , S, C {d1 , ... , d, } representing which data is allocated to
which firm, and prices pij paid by firm i to data set j if j E Si.
Our goal is to find data allocations that maximize both profit and learning. This can
also be visually represented by a weighted bipartite graph M such that there are n nodes
representing firms, m nodes representing vendors and edges only exist between these groups.
The weight of the edge encodes the price paid for the data.
Definition 9. Given a data valuation game, a data matching graph is defined as the
weighted bipartite graph M between nodes representing firms and nodes representing vendors
such that the weight of each edge represents the amount of money paid by a particular firm
for a particular dataset.
Note that an allocation in the sense of definition 8 corresponds to a unique data matching
graph. The challenge of designing a mechanism to value and trade data then becomes finding
a good matching M. We need the parties to present their information truthfully, otherwise
the value of data will be ill-defined. This means that firms will not be incentivized to alter
their information and vendors need to properly represent their data as well. If we design a
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mechanism in which there is an incentive to lie, then the value of a piece of data in that
case is meaningless. Additionally we need to design a mechanism in which there is some
incentive to play i.e. participants always have some positive benefit. Finally, there may be
many matchings M 1, ... , Mp that satisfy the above conditions. To distinguish among them,
we need to define some kind of system wide goal such as matchings that maximize total
learning or maximize total revenue (the sum of edge weights in the graph.)
Note that, from the perspective of both firms and vendors, the data matching graph
contains all the information necessary to determine their utility. Hence, we may rewrite the
utility of the firms as simply Vi(M) and of vendors as uj(M). One important consideration
in designing an auction (as this is a highly complex example of an auction) is that the agents
who value an object the most receive that object. In our case, the value a firm has for
an individual piece of data is linked to what other data they have received, as well as the
information of other firms. One method with which to measure this would be to look at the
incremental difference of (M) when an edge, representing transmission of a single data
set, is removed.
Definition 10. Suppose that firm fi and data set dj are neighbors in the data matching
graph M. The incremental value VUj(M) of a dataset dj to the firm fi is the difference
(M ) - Vi(M') where M' is the same as M minus the edge connecting fi and dj.
This definition works fine when we consider data that firm fi is already allocated. How-
ever, suppose we wanted to determine fi's incremental value for a piece of data it does not
have like dk. In this case, we may add an edge to M and do the same procedure, but it is
unclear what weight this edge should be. This brings us to our first simplifying assumption
on M, namely that edges connected to a dataset dk must all have the same weight. In
fact, this will play a pivotal role in designing a truthful payment mechanism later on. With
this in mind, we may define the incremental value of data dk to firm fi as the difference
Vik(M) = i(M') - Vi(M) where M' contains an edge between dk and fj whose weight is
determined by the algorithm generating matchings.
Now, back to auctions. The goal of an auction is to allocate goods to the firms that value
them most. With the above definitions we may define the notion of a stable matching. Let
Si(M) be the set of data sets received by firm fi in matching M and likewise let Rj(M)
be the set of firms receiving data set dj in that same matching. For the remainder of this
section, we suppose that k1 = Rj(M) is a fixed parameter of the system. So vendors must
decide ahead of time exactly how many times to replicate their data.
Definition 11. Given a data valuation game and an associated data matching graph M, the
36
matching M is called a stable matching if for every firm i and every data set j E Si(M)
we have that Vi(M ) ;> Vkj(M) for every k Rj(M).
This means that a matching M is stable if there is never the case that firm fi incremen-
tally values dj more than another firm fk, and dj is allocated to fk and not fi.
Proposition 12. If a matching M is not stable it cannot maximize total learning.
n
Proof. Define V(M) = i V(M) and note that if M is not stable, it is the case that firm fi
values dk more than fj and dk is only allocated to fj. Here, if we alter the matching M to
M' such that instead of an edge between dk and f3 there is now an edge between dk and fi,
by definition, the utility V(M) < V(M') and hence M cannot maximize total learning. 0
As the above result shows, if we would like to maximize social welfare in terms of learning
(or more generally bidder utility) we must consider only stable matchings.
Before beginning to describe a method to build such matching M consider a simple
example. Suppose we have two firms fi, f2, and two data sets d1, d2 such that the utility
of each firm is given by u1 (0) = 0, ui(di) = 1, ui(d2 ) = 1, ui(di U d2 ) = 10 and U2 (0)
0,u 2 (di) = 2, ui(d2 ) = 2,ui(di U d2 ) = 4.
At this point there are several methods to consider.
We might first take a greedy approach, simply adding an Firm 1 Vendor 1
edge at the point where the incremental value Vij(M) is
the greatest. In this case, we must decide what the weight
of the edge should be and at what point to stop adding Firm 2 Vendor 2
edges, lest we end up with a complete graph.
Doing this and stopping after adding 2 edges gives the
Figure 3-1: A Greedily Constructed
following stable graph seen in figure 3-1. However, the Matching.
high value of giving both d, and d 2 in combination to firm
fi suggests that the matching seen in figure 3-2 would be more profitable. Furthermore, if
we continue this greedy process until there are 3 edges, we obtain a graph that is no longer
stable, implying that someone, fi who values d 2 more than f2 doesn't get it.
Firm 1 Vendor 1
Firm 2 Vendor 2
Figure 3-2: A Better Matching.
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We would like to avoid the possibility that this algorithm
might cycle between different matchings, never converging to
an optimal graph as seen in figure 3-3 and we additionally need
* to make sure that whichever matching this algorithm termi-
0 nates at is truthful. If, for example, we construct a graph such
as in figure 3-4 where the firms pay exactly their valuations for
igure 3-3: A Cycling Algorithm the data, they will be incentivized to lie about those valuations
Firm 1 Vendor
2
Firm 2 Vendor2
Figure 3-4: An Untruthful Matehi
to the system.
In this case truthful reporting is no longer a Nash equi-
1 libria, a situation we need to avoid. In total, we are looking
for an algorithm with the following properties:
2 * The algorithm to find M can't get stuck at a solution
that is not stable, in the sense defined above.
ng. . The algorithm cannot cycle.
* The algorithm must terminate at a matching M that
incentivizes truthful reporting from firms and ven-
dors.
Note that firms providing the mechanism with information {11, ... , n}, gi (), and Ai, is
mathematically the same as simply providing functions Vij(M). Hence for notational brevity
we will assume that firms simply report these functions.
Proposition 13. Consider a data valuation game with n firms and one vendor and one
corresponding data set d. Suppose that the vendor has already decided it will replicate the
data 1 < k < n times. In this case, there exists a truthful mechanism to allocate the data.
Proof. In order to construct such a mechanism, we will generalize the idea of a second
price auction, in which the winning bidder must pay the second highest bid for the object
in question. Here, we define the k winners to be those k firms fi, ... , fk (without loss of
generality firms are ordered by V(d) > V2 (d) > ... > V,(d)) who have the k highest values
Vi(d) for the data set. Each of these firms pay Vk+1(d) for the data d. In this case, no
firm has an incentive to change their information. To see this, we will consider two case.
First, consider a firm fi who wins the data by submitting information truthfully. Then,
suppose they lie about their information, changing their valuation of the data to Xi(d). If
#i(d) > V(d), they still win the object and have the same positive utility Vi(d) - Vk+1 which
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is the same as if Vk+l(d) < i(d) < Vi(d). Finally, if Vk+1(d) > i(d) the firm fi gets utility
0. So in any of these cases, there is no incentive to lie about the information firm fi provides.
Second, suppose fi does not get allocated d when they truthfully provide information. If
they lie to get a new valuation Vi(d), there are several possibilities: if i(d) < V(d), they
still lose the object and get utility 0; if Vk(d) > i(d) > Vi(d), again they get utility 0; and
finally if Vk(d) < 17i(d), they receive the object and get negative utility Vi(d) - Vk(d). So in
any case, there is no incentive to lie, and this is a truthful mechanism. E3
Definition 14. In a data valuation game, we will call the above mechanism a generalized
second price auction.
3.1.1 Separable Data
In the case of more than one data set, we need to find the right amount firms should pay
for data sets in transactions given by M. To this end, suppose we have a data valuation
game with n firms, m vendors and an associated data matching graph M. Suppose further
that this graph is stable. As before, let Si(M) be the set of data sets received by firm fi in
matching M and let Rj(M) be the set of firms receiving data set dj in that same matching.
Then we may generalize the Vickrey auction discussed in the introduction by setting the
price of each piece of data sold to the highest incremental valuation of that data by those
who did not receive it. In mathematical terms, the price pj(M) of data dj in the matching
M is given by max Vkj(M). If the set Rj (M) {fi, ... , ft} then we set the price pj = 0.
kZR3 (M)
It can be shown that in the case of multiple data sets, this is not necessarily a truthful
mechanism. However, by putting certain structure on the way firms value data, this can be
remedied.
One major difficulty in trying to sell and value data in a market is that many different
pieces of information may contain substitutive value. For example, if a climatologist were
looking for data about greater Boston area, the weather reports in Cambridge and Boston
would tell them very similar information. Hence, both data sets are not necessary for learn-
ing. If we suppose though, that one of the stipulations of the market is that vendors sell
differing data sets, we could avoid this problem. What we would like to be able to do is,
given the number of times each data set is replicated kj, auction each good off individually
to construct the desired data matching.
Definition 15. Given a data valuation game with n firms and m vendors, the data sets
d1,...,d, are called separable if for every pair of data matchings M, M', every i E [n] and
every j E [m] we have Vi((M ) =Vi (M')
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With this in place, let's consider a greedy method of constructing matchings by choosing
a single data set at a time to auction. In this case we order the data sets by the amount
of total revenue they receive in a generalized second price auction as above, then iteratively
perform these auctions to create the matching. Suppose for the remainder of this section
that there are no ties in valuing data i.e. Vi (M) h Vkj (M) for all k, i, j and matchings M.
This makes tie breaking a non issue. This could also be solved by saying that if firms tie, if
in doubt the firm with the smaller index is allocated the good.
Algorithm 1 Elementwise Matching Contstruction
Input: V1 , ... , V,,: valuation functions; di, ... , din: separable datasets; k1 , ... , kin: number
of reproductions of each data set.
1: for j from 1 to m do
2: Do: Generalized second price auction auction:
3: Find kj highest bids Vi(0). Call the kj + ith highest bid V*.
4: Add an edge eij of weight V* for all i with kj highest bids.
5: Return: Optimal stable matching M with edges given by the process above.
Theorem 16. Given a data valuation game with separable data, a stable matching M with
payments defined using the generalized second price auction is unique and truthful.
In order to prove this, we state and prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 17. In a data valuation game with separable data, a stable matching can be found by
individually performing m generalized second price auctions on the single data sets d1 ,...,dm
where values for firms are given simply by Vjj(0), and then combining these auctions to
construct a matching. In other words, there will be an edge between fi and dj in M if and
only if in the auction for dj, fi is allocated the data set.
Proof. Consider such a matching M. If M were unstable, it would be the case that for
i E R3 (M) and k 0 R3(M), Vi(M) < Vkj(M). But, since the data is separable this
would imply that Vi(0) < V 3 (0). This is a contradiction since the generalized second price
mechanism on a single data set would not have allocated the data set dj to fi instead of fk
if this were the case. l
Lemma 18. A data valuation game with separable data has a unique stable matching.
Proof. Note that the number of times each data set is replicated is fixed by the vendors at
kl,..., km. Hence, consider any matching M' different to the matching M constructed in
the previous lemma. Suppose M' has an edge between fi and dj where M does not. This
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implies by the above construction that Vij(M) < Vkj(M) for some k who is not allocated
the data dj in M'. Hence M' cannot be a stable matching.
Lemma 19. A data valuation game with separable data is truthful under the generalized
second price auction mechanism and the above matching algorithm.
Proof. This fact follows from the fact that the matching, and hence the utility of each firm,
is simply a combination of individual auctions. Hence, by changing their information firm
fi is playing m different auctions in which he will not benefit from changing his strategy as
shown in proposition 13. Thus there is no incentive for firms participating in this market
mechanism to lie about information they provide to the system. El
In total, these three lemmas prove theorem 16, and furthermore, since there exists a
unique equilibrium in this case, the notion of the price, or value, of data is well defined.
Related to the idea of separability above is the notion of partially separability data
Definition 20. Given a data valuation game with n firms and m vendors, the data sets
d,...,d,n are called partially separable if there exists a partition S ={S} of {1, ... , m}
such that the function Vi (d1 , ... , dn) can be decomposed into the sum Vi,s (dsj) where ds,
represents data in the set Si.
Now suppose we have a method A with which to define an optimal matching in a data
valuation problem.
Corollary 21. Given a data valuation game with partially separable data partitioned by
S = {Sj} and optimal algorithm A to assign matchings, an optimal matching for this case
can be found by iteratively applying algorithm A to the subproblems selling data Si to firms
in order to construct a matching for all data {1, ... ,}.
Sadly in most cases, the restriction of separability or partial separability is unrealistic,
however, we may generalize this method.
3.1.2 e Separability
Definition 22. Given a data valuation game, data sets d1 , ... , dn are called E separable if
for any matching M, we have | Vi(M) - Vi( 0 )| < e. In other words, data in combination is
roughly the same in value when considered individually.
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As a market designer, one can imagine that the system itself gets some percentage of
each transaction and hence, would like to maximize the total revenue of any stable matching
it constructs. Along these lines, the system would like to maximize the total value V of
matchings it selects.
Definition 23. The total value V(M) of matching M is the total revenue, or sum of all
edge weights, in the allocation. The optimal such V for a data valuation game is called the
value of the game.
In the case of separable data, this is not an issue since there is only a single stable
matching. However, if we have a data valuation game with e-separable data, we may still
construct a matching, that is not necessarily truthful or stable, but that has nice guarantees
on its total value. Before we state this result, we introduce the idea of subadditive learning.
Definition 24. In a data valuation game, we say that learning is subadditive if for every
firm fi, and every data set dj, Vi(M) < Vi(M') if Sj(M') C Si(M). In other words, the
incremental value of data decreases as more data is processed.
Using these relaxations of the earlier constraints on the value functions, we can modify
our original algorithm so that as before, the system individually auctions the data sets, but
now the winners pay the alternative amount for data dj given by max Vkj(M). It is
koRj(M)
possible, if e is large or if there is other instability in the system that this matching will not
be stable.
Algorithm 2 Modified Elementwise Matching Contstruction
Input: V, .... , V: valuation functions; dl, ... , d,: e separable datasets; k1 , ... , k,: number
of reproductions of each data set.
1: for j from 1 to m do
2: Do: Generalized second price auction auction on functions Vi(0):
3: Find kj highest bids Vi (0).
4: Add an edge eij for all i with kj highest bids.
5: Return: Unweighted matching M with edges specified by the process above.
6: for j from 1 to m do
7: For each dj, set edge weight of all edges in M connected to dj to max Vkj(M)
kwRj(M)
8: Return: Weighted matching M.
In addition to this, we see that data valuation games that are simply perturbed ver-
sions of games with separable data inherit many of the nice properties of their more basic
predecessors.
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Theorem 25. Given a data valuation game with c-separable data, as long as e < 6(Vi, ..., Vn, d1 , ... , dm)
where J(V1,..., V, d1 ,..., dm) is some parameter of the system, there exists a polynomial time
algorithm to find a stable matching.
Proof. Suppose that using values Vi (0) we construct the unique matching M using algorithm
2. In this case, for each data set dj, we can define the value 6j to be the difference
(5= min V(0) - Vk(0).
iERj(M)
kVRj(M)
Then using these parameters we can define 6' = min 6j with which we can further define
1<j<in
6(Vi, ... , ,di, ... , dm) = 6'/2. Note then that if e < S(Vi, ... , Vdi, ... , dm), the matching
that algorithm 2 provides remains stable since
min Vi(M) - Vkj(M) > min Vi(0) - Vk3 (0) - 2e > 0.
iERj(M) iERj(M)
kj Rj(M) kg Rj(M)
This implies that for any firm fi receiving data dj in the matching M, we have Vi(M) >
Vkj(M) for all k 0 R,(M), hence the matching M is stable.
Thus, given any game, there is a simple way of checking whether or not we may use
algorithm 2 to find a matching. We simply need to find the value of 6(V1, ... , V, dl, ... , dm)
that belongs to this game and then determine how c-separable the data is. As long as
e < 6(V1, ... , Vn, d1, ... , di) the algorithm will converge efficiently to a desirable solution.
These results suggest another benefit of data matching mechanisms. As discussed earlier,
it is important for vendors to sell unique data. Otherwise, if all sources of information are
essentially the same as far as learning is concerned, competition will drive down prices and
there will cease to be an incentive to sell. One method to solve this problem would be
to only include data that satisfies the properties stipulated above. In particular, suppose
there is a system with firms fi, ... , fu, and data sets dj, ... , d, that satisfy e separability with
e < 3(Vi, ..., ,Vn di, ... , d,). In this case, suppose there is an additional data set dm+1 that
the system could value and sell as well. Before including it in the transaction however, the
mechanism could calculate the new value 6(V, ... , V, di, ... , dm, dm+i) as well as the new e
associated to the game. If e remains smaller than 6(V1 , ... , Xn, di, ... , dm, dm+1), then it makes
sense to include the new data dm+i, otherwise it could be discarded. Now, calculating the
new e is highly computationally taxing since it involves examining the new values Vi(M)
where dm+1 is included. However, it turns out this is unnecessary. All that is needed is to
use algorithm 2 to get a matching M with dm+1 included and then determine the maximum
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deviance of Vi(M) from the values Vij(0). In this sense we can define
E =max Vi (M) - Vij(0)
1<i<n
<j!m+1
. If < 6(V1, ... , Vn, di, ... , dM, d,+ 1 ) by the same reasoning as in Theorem 25, Algorithm 2
converges in polynomial time to a stable matching. Hence, by selectively choosing the data
to include in a transaction, we can guarantee that we may use an efficient algorithm to value
and sell data. These results are summarized by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Discriminative Data Selection
Input: V1 , ... , VI: valuation functions; di, ... , dm: E separable datasets; kl, ... , km: number
of reproductions of each data set; d,+1, k + m + 1: new data set with reproduction limit.
1: for j from 1 to m + 1 do
2: Do: Generalized second price auction auction on functions Vi(O):
3: Find kj highest bids V (0).
4: Add an edge eij for all i with kj highest bids.
5: Return: Unweighted matching M with edges specified by the process above.
6: for j from 1 to m do
7: For each dj, set edge weight of all edges in M connected to dj to max Vkj(M)
k R,(M)
8: Return: Weighted matching M.
9: for i from 1 to m + 1 do
10: z= min Vi (0) - Vj (0).
iERj(M)
kVR, (M)
11: j = min 6j /2(1<j<m)
12: j = max |Vi (M) - Vi (0)1<i<n
13: if E < 5 then
14: Include dm+1
15: else
16: Discard dm+i
3.1.3 Simulations
In order to simulate the operation of the greedy algorithm described in this chapter, we
first needed to develop a method with which to construct valuation functions in a way that
their separability could be controlled. This was achieved by writing such functions V(S)
as functions of indicators V(zi, ... , Zm) where zj is 1 if data set j goes to this firm. Then
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Figure 3-6: Greedy Versus Optimal Learning.
we can simplify this expression by creating a quadratic form V(zi, ... , z") = zTQz. Note
that in the case the data is separable, Q will be a diagonal matrix. Hence, by perturbing
diagonal matrices to increasing degrees, we are able to construct valuation functions with a
controllable level of separability.
With this, we considered the case of 5
firms fi, ..., f5 and 4 data sets di, ..., d4 such
that each firm is assigned a random Q with
some level of separability. Then the greedy
algorithm described above was executed re-
sulting in some level of global learning and
a corresponding matching. Finally, the opti-
mal allocation was calculated with the same
associated statistics. We saw that, for mod-
erate amounts of separability, the matchings
provided by both mechanisms, seen in Fig-
ure 3-5, are not very different. Additionally,
Greedy Matching
Figure 3-5: Greedy V
Moderate Separability
Optimal Matching
ersus Optimal Matching Given
as the amount of separability increases (or the matrices Q become closer and closer to di-
agonal) the graphs in Figure 3-6 show that the learning provided by the greedy algorithm
approaches the optimal learning.
These simulations support the results above in that they show how our greedy algorithm
works extremely well with separable or near separable data. It also demonstrates that when
data is only moderately separable, in our case meaning the matrices Q are only somewhat
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Cn
diagonally dominant, the greedy algorithm still performs well. This implies that in prac-
tice, such an algorithm would be very successful in assigning approximately optimal data
allocations.
3.1.4 Profit Maximization and Optimal Replication
In the results above, the goal generally was to optimize the total welfare of the firms partici-
pating in the system. We examined how several algorithms might construct socially optimal
solutions. However, this analysis neglected the utility of the vendors selling the data. One
could argue that the socially optimal solution in terms of learning must be close to optimal
for vendor's profit as well since, if firms are learning more they are willing to pay more.
However, in the design of such algorithms, sometimes vendor's profit falls by the wayside
in order to incentivize truthfulness. This isn't a good situation and could drive vendors to
leave the market if they are not being fairly compensated for their data. For example, one
might consider the case in which a data set is highly valuable to only one firm, and negligibly
valuable to the others. Using the mechanism described above, the vendor in this case would
not be able to gain much profit from selling this data, despite its value to one firm. In order
to fix such a situation, more attention should be paid to the vendor's side of things.
Above we assumed that the vendors have the ability to replicate their data a certain
number of times kj. With something like data, this replication is free, and so it begs the
question why vendors wouldn't be willing to replicate their information n times. Broadly,
the reason they wouldn't want to do this boils down to supply and demand. If they is a
glut of a certain data set it becomes less valuable than if it is scarce even when firms are
essentially non competitive. This is clear in the above mechanism where replicating n times
would give profit of 0, and in other scenarios. Hence, kj, the number of times a data set is
copied becomes an important parameter with which vendors, or the system, can maximize
profit. To see how this might work, consider the following example.
Example 26. Consider a data valuation game in which there is one data set d1 , and n
firms each with value v 1 > v2 > ... > vn for this information. Suppose we define k to
be the number of times that d1 is copied, and using the generalized second price auction
mechanism, we would like to find the k that maximizes profit. In this case, we will calculate
k* = argmaxvk+lk. This is all well and good, however, consider the k* + 1th firm. They
kE[n-1]
now have an incentive to lower their valuation vk*+1 -- vk*+2 + e. In this case, the value in
the maximization k* = argmaxvk+1 k becomes k* - k* + 1 so that now fk*+1 is included in
ke[n-1]
the allocation of d1 . However, this means that the mechanism is no longer truthful strategy
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dominant.
As we can see by the above example, changing the parameters of the mechanism in
response to firms' reports generally leads to situations that can be exploited by lying. In
fact, in a perverse way, your truthfulness depends on the fact that the price of a good is
completely independent for your valuation of that good. Otherwise, you may manipulate
the system. This seems to suggest that attempting to maximize vendor's profit is entirely
pointless if it will always lead to a mechanism that is not truthful, however, we still have a
few tricks up our sleeve. Let's stick with the case of a single data set, and change our model
slightly so that the vendor now offers a price p for that data set, and firms who have vi > p
are allocated the data at that price. We might imagine doing the same sort of optimization
over p as we did before with k to maximize profit, but again we see this creates an untruthful
mechanism (for identical reasons.) However, in this paradigm we can come up with several
work arounds. First, consider the case that the vendor specifies a target profit R they would
like to obtain from the transaction. In this case, we can define a truthful mechanism that
will achieve this if possible. To do this, we search over the vi's to find a set S C [n] with
fSI = k such that for all i E S, vi > R/k. If such a set can be found, then for the smallest
possible k, we allocate the data to these fi for i E S for a price R/k. Here, there is no
incentive to lie as doing so will not increase your utility.
This is an encouraging result that might suggest that we look for the best R possible, but
again, this would run into the same problems we had before. The way to fix this is to partition
[n] randomly into two subsets F1 , F2 such that we may calculate R1 = maxpl{i E Filvi > p}Ip>o
and R2 = maxpl{i c F21vi > p}I. Using these two values, we can run the same auction likep>o
mechanism above using R1 on F2 and R2 on F1 . It is important to note that either R1 < R2
or R 2 < R1 . Suppose without loss of generality that R1  R 2 , then we are guaranteed to
find k firms in F2 such that vi > R1 /k, so we are guaranteed a profit of min{R1, R2 } from
this process. This trick allows us to at least partially optimize the profit gained from selling
a single data set in a truthful way, but unfortunately, there is no clear way to generalize this
to the case of multiple data sets (unless they are separable.) This drawback aside, we do
have the following result:
Theorem 27. In a data valuation game with one data set and n firms, the mechanism
described above achieves expected revenue E(Revenue) such that
E(Revenue) > OPT/4
where OPT is the optimal revenue defined by OPT = max pl{i E [n] vi > p}I.
p>o
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Proof. OPT indicates an optimal price p* for the data, and k firms who buy it. Additionally,
after we randomly partition [n] into F and F2 , there are k1 firms in F who are allocated d,
and k 2 firms in F2 who get it. Now suppose we calculate R1 = maxp > OpI{i E F Ivi > p}I
and R 2 = maxp > OpI{i E F2 Ivi > p}1. Here we see that R1 > p*ki and likewise R 2 > p*k2.
Using this and the fact that E(Revenue) = E(min{R1 , R2}), we have that
E(Revenue) >E(min{R1 , R2})
OPT - kp*
> E(min{kip*, k2p*})
kp*
> E(min{ki, k2})
- k
Now note that if we condition on the fact that there are k replications of the data, the
expectation E(min{ki, k2 }) can be bounded inductively. For k = 1, E(min{ki, k2}) = 0,
and for k = 2, E(min{ki, k2 }) = 1/2. Note that for k increasing E(min{ki, k2}) = Mk =
Mk - Mkl + Mk_1 and if we let the increment be defined as Xk Mk - Mk_1 we see that
k
E(min{ki, k 2 }) = E Xk. Then if we have i odd we see that ki f k2 and hence, Xi = 1/2
i=1
whereas if i is even Xi > 0. This gives us that
k
E(min{ki, k2}) = Xi
i=1
k I k
22 4
But then, we see that E(Revenue) > and hence that E(Revenue) > OPT/4. lOPT -k
This is an interesting result in trying to optimally sell one data set, however, it cannot be
clearly extended to the more combinatorially complex case of multiple data sets. Still though,
it illustrates the importance of maintaining independence between prices and valuations in
these sorts of transactions, an observation that will be crucial in much of this thesis.
In this chapter, we saw how to generalize a truthful mechanism in the presence of many
data sets. We also demonstrated the difficulty in developing such a mechanism with which
to sell data and showed, how truthful profit maximization might be achieved.
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Chapter 4
Integer Programming Methods
4.1 Integer Programming and Incentive Compatibility
In mechanism design, the goal is to create a system in which individuals have the incentive
to act in a way that optimizes a global variable. In the case of auctions, this welfare can be
measured by the total utility of participants. This is usually optimal for the sellers of these
goods as well since the more utility bidders receive in the system, the more they are willing
to pay. In our case of valuing and selling data, note that if we have independent firms and
vendors with no feedback, we may write the problem of finding a suitable matching that
maximizes social welfare in terms of learning as the following integer program:
n
max ZZVi(S)y(S, i)
i=1 SCM
n
SAt. y(S, i) < kj Vj (E {1, ... , M}
SjjES %
y(S, 0) < 1 Vi E Il ... n}
SCM
y(S, i) E{0, 1}
where V (S) is the valuation of firm fi for subset of data S C M, kj is the reproduction
limit of jth data set dj and y(S, i) is an indicator variable representing which data goes
to which firm. This method of optimization is the most common technique in analyzing
combinatorial auctions, however in our case we run into several difficulties. First of all,
there is no reason that kj should necessarily be limited or predetermined. We note that in
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the case that kj = n the solution of this problem is trivial with every firm receiving every
dataset. Furthermore, this optimization problem does not specify payments for goods. This
could be solved by taking the dual of the Lagrangian relaxation of the problem above, and
interpreting dual variables associated with the first set of constraints as prices for goods.
However, without guaranteeing that the relaxation of the problem is integral, there is no
guarantee such a method will yield a reasonable solution. Also, the combinatorial complexity
of the bids V themselves are difficult to work with. Later in this section we propose a method
to simplify representational complexity.
Another problem with this formulation is that there isn't an incentive compatible mech-
anism to induce bidders to bid truthfully. In other words, they could lie about the function
Vi to get a better outcome. In order to eliminate this possibility we as the auction designers
need to develop a way to design payments to fix this. The most common way this is done is
through a payment structure known as a VCG mechanism. Suppose we have solved the inte-
ger program above to get a solution y* and total utility V. Then suppose we solve the same
problem without firm k to get an optimal value V-k. In this case, the system would charge
agent k the price V-k - (V - E Vk(S)y*(S, k)) which is precisely the difference in total util-
SCM
ity of the system (other than firm k) with and without k's participation. In this case agent
k's utility becomes E Vk(S)y*(S, k) - V-k - (V - E Vk(S)y*(S, k)) = V -V-k > 0
SCM SCM
since the addition of agent k can only increase the value of the optimal solution. Finally,
this is incentive compatible since if agent k lies, the total value of the allocation calculated
will be V' < V and his own personal utility will be V' - V-k < V - V-k so there is no incen-
tive not to report truthfully. The problem with this is that calculating the prices involves
actually solving the above integer program exactly multiple times. Furthermore, there are
results showing that if you calculate valuations and solutions approximately, the same VCG
mechanism may not be incentive compatible.
One nice result is that in the case of one data set and n firms, the VCG mechanism
is exactly the generalized second price auction have previously been using. Additionally,
in the case of separable data, the mechanism we use is also a VCG mechanism. For more
complicated cases though, there exist fewer results.
4.1.1 Representational Complexity
In combinatorial auctions, the representational complexity of bids is a problem. In our case,
this is compounded by the fact that the system itself has to calculate these bids in order to
utilize them. This means that, in the case that n and m are even moderately large, the task
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of solving for the V's will become computationally infeasible. Generally in the literature this
is solved by either stating that bidders are so called "single minded" in that they only want
a single subset S or there is some other structure imposed limiting the complexity of bids.
In our case, if we consider the case of separable data above, we see that the value functions
Vj(S) are given by V(S) = E aj where aj are fixed parameters of the system. This is fine if
jES
data has no complementary or substitutive value structures, however, this is more than likely
too strong an assumption. One extension of this to allow for such complementary effects
would be to measure pairwise "complementaryness" of different data sets. In other words,
one might calculate V(di) + V(d 2 ) - V(di U d2 ) to get an estimate of how much two pieces
of data overlap. Suppose there were only two data sets di, d2 , then each valuation function
must take on 4 values for 0, di, d2 , di U d2 . Here represent V as the function V(zi, z2) where
zi is an indicator function associated to including data set i in the allocation to the firm.
Then we can write V(zi, z2 ) = a1 z1 + a2z 2 + aCziz 2 where aI = V(1, 0), a 2 = V(0, 1) and
a3 = V(1, 1) - Vi (1, 0) - Vi (0, 1). This example extends to the following proposition:
Proposition 28. Any valuation function V(zi,..., Z.), where zi is an indicator function
associated to data set i, can be written as an n degree polynomial in the zj's where any term
with z' for p > 1 has coefficient 0.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of data sets m. If m = 1 we easily
see this is true. Now suppose this holds for m < k. When m = k, consider such functions
gs(zs1 , ... , Zs,, 1 ) on all subsets of m of size m -1. If we set the coefficient a corresponding to
the term z1 z2...zn we can calculate a = V (zi, ... , zrn) - E gs(zs 1, ... , M1). Then, combining
this with the previously calculated functions (which by construction agree on intersecting
terms) we obtain the desired polynomial. l
This gives us another way of describing the valuation functions. Suppose also that the
data has some regularities in that learning is submodular. It is reasonable to assume then
that taking the above polynomial and getting rid of all terms higher than degree two should
reasonably approximate the value firm i has for different sets. This is good since it still
captures some of the complementaries and substitution effects of data learning while being
reasonably computable. In essence then, our system has to calculate only the individual
value of the data sets to the firms and then some pairwise values in order to write down an
estimate i of the true valuation.
This brings us back to incentive compatibility. Given the above parametrization of the Vi
functions, can we design an incentive compatible mechanism that works efficiently? Does this
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parametrization somehow give the integer program above some structure we may exploit?
All of these are intriguing questions.
4.1.2 Iterative Auctions
One method proposed in the combinatorial auction literature to assign an allocations is an
iterative auction. There are two main flavors of these methods. The first has bidders assign
prices they are willing to pay for different bundles of goods, tentatively creates an allocation,
and allows bidders to change their valuation to increase their utility. Here it is the bidders
that change how much they value the goods. The other case posts a set of prices pi for
the goods with which bidders can evaluate which bundle is most valuable to them given
these prices. They release this optimal bundle to the auctioneer who increases or decreases
the price of goods in order to clear the market. This paradigm seems most useful for our
purposes and could be an efficient way, particularly given some structure on the valuation
functions, of approximating an optimal allocation.
Note that here our goal is to set prices in order to maximize social welfare measured
by total learning. There is an intrinsic relationship between the price of a data set and the
optimal data bundle demanded by each firm. Assume each firm values data independently of
the allocation to others and that there exist functions V1 , ... , V, describing the utility of each
data bundle S C {1, ... , m}. In order to formalize the problem, let's consider the following
integer program:
n
max >3 >3 I(S)y(i, S)
=11 ~3 s {,.. }s.t. E E y (i, S) < kj Vj E {1, ..., m}
i=1 sljES
Sy(i, S) 1 Vi C {1, ... , n}
SC{1,...,m}
y(i,7 S) E 0, 1} VS, t
This integer program describes the problem of creating a data allocation in order to
maximize E E V(S)y(i, S). Nowhere in this problem are prices mentioned, however,
i=1 SC{1,...,m}
it is well known that the dual of such a problem has dual variables that can be interpreted
as prices. There is a problem with this in that the dual of such an integer program will
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not be an easily solvable optimization in general. To solve this, we introduce the following
relaxation of the above integer program:
max
z=1 sg{1,..m}
Vi(S)y(i, S)
n
SAt. y (i, S) < kj Vj Ez {1, ..., m}
i=1 SlIES
y(, S) < 1 Vi E {1, ... , n}
SC{1,... }
y(Z, S) E [0, 1] VS, Z
which allows the variables y(i, S) to range between 0 and 1. One possible interpretation of
this relaxation is that variables y(i, S) now represent probabilities that firm i will get subset
S in some randomly realized allocation. We assume that the expected number of copies of
each data set sold is less than or equal to kj and that total learning, or social welfare is
maximized in expectation. Other than that, this relaxation allows us to approximate some
optimal solution to the integer program above. This allows us now to consider the following
optimization:
Z(A) = max E E
i=1 SC{1,...,m}
s.t.>3
Sg {1,..,
Vi(S)y(i, S) + EA kj
j=1
-~ > yG, S)
S=1 slIeS
y(i, S) E [0, 1] VSi
It is easy to solve this using traditional linear programming techniques in the case that
A = {Aj} is fixed. It is also useful to rewrite the objective function of this optimization as
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y(i, S) < I Vt. E {I, ... , n}
n Mn
V (S)y(i, S) + A k - y(Z, S)
= {. j=i (k = sljs Yl iS)
= Ak + E(Vi(S)y(i, S) - Ajy(i, S))
=1 i=1 i=1 SC{1,...,m}
St. jES
= Ak + E E y(i, S) (VS) - 5 A)
j=1 i=1 SC{1...,m} iES
Now if we interpret the Aj as prices for the different data sets, the values (S) - E AjjeS
can be interpreted as the profit of firm i from the set S given some set of prices. In this case
then, using tools from linear and integer programming, we have that minimizing the above
maximization with respect to A will give the prices associated to the optimal assignment of
the y(i, S). Note that given a set of prices A the firm will want to set y(S, i) to a positive
value when the term (S) - E Aj is maximized for all S. In this way, firms choose one
jES
(or several) optimal bundles S for each pricing A, following the discussion earlier in the
section. Finally, finding the optimal prices A simply involves solving min Z(A) which, since
A>O
the objective
SAk + E E y(i, S) V(S) - E A)j=1 i=1 SC{1 ... ,m} jES
is piecewise linear and convex in A, can be accomplished through the subgradient algorithm.
This algorithm states that in order to minimize Z(A), we initialize A to Ao, then update
At -+ At + Oi(Vy - k) where y is the vector of the y(i, S) and V is the (n2') x m matrix
with entries in the jth row corresponding to sets S and bidders i that are 0 if j g S and
is Vi(S) otherwise. k is the vector [ki, ... , km]T. This gives us another way to calculate the
price of the data sets, however, since the matrix V (and other terms in the optimization)
are exponentially large it is still tough from a computational perspective. Additionally, since
we're solving the dual to a relaxed integer optimization, the solution will be an upper bound
on the actual integer program we would like to solve. However, it gives us a good sense of
how valuable different data sets are and in specific cases may give unique optimal prices.
We would like to use the same technique outlined above in a way that utilizes the struc-
ture of the approximations for Vi described in the previous section in order to simplify the
optimization. Consider the case that the have structure (zai, ... , Zim) =E aijzij. This
j=1
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models the case in which there are no complementary or substitutive effects between different
data sets. Here, we can write the optimization in the form
n m
max Y3 E %i zij
i=1 j=1
n
s.t. zi 3  k7 Vj E {1, ... , m}
i= 1
zij E {0, 1} Vilj
This integer program can be transformed in the same way as above to get approximately
optimal prices A3 and is far simpler computationally. However, disregarding the interplay
between learning different data in combination loses much of the character of the problem.
In order to include this, we could rewrite
Vi( I, ..., Zim) =3 %i Z + E E / 3iAkZijZik
j=1 j=1 k=j
where the terms 3 iyjkZiiJZk model substitutive or complementary effects of learning both
pieces of data. For example, for firm fi if learning data d, and d2 accomplish roughly
the same thing then /ijk should be set to a negative value such that Vi (1, 1, 0, 0, ... , 0) =
CN1 + cN2 - 3 ijk max{aii, af 2 }. So the sign and magnitude of !ijk indicates the pairwise
substitutive/ complementary effects of learning two data sets dj and dk. As previously noted,
if we assume learning is submodular and hence that a firm won't demand more than a small
number of data sets that overlap in information, this structure on Vi should give us an
effective way of estimating any such valuation function. With this in place, we can rewrite
Vj(zji,Z...,zim) as the quadratic form V (zi, ... , zirn) = z[(Qi)zi where Qj is the symmetric
m x m matrix with entries Qkj = O/3k/2 for k # j and Qjj = aij. With this, we can rewrite
the entire optimization as
max zT(Q)z
s.t. Az < k
zjE {0, 1} Vi,j
where A is the (nm) x m matrix whose ith row has Aij = 1 for j i mod n, k is the
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vector of data limits k = [k 1, ..., km]T, z is the concatenation of the zis and Q is the block
diagonal matrix with blocks Qi. Note that it isn't overly difficult for a system to empirically
calculate the Qi for each firm by simply "learning" each data set independently and then
pairwise.
Definition 29. In a data valuation problem, call the empirically calculated matrix Qi which
estimates V, the quadratic approximation of i's valuation Vi.
With this, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 30. Suppose the matrices Qi are all strictly diagonally dominant. Then there
exists a polynomial time algorithm to approximate optimal prices for data sets d 1 , ... ,d.
Proof of this fact follows from Q, which must positive definite by our assumption, hence,
the relaxed quadratic programming problem (and thus its dual) are solvable in polynomial
time. This relates to our previous notion of e separable data in that the condition of the
theorem essentially means that Vi(di) + Vi(d 2) V(di, d 2 ) which was what our previous
separability notion was trying to formalize. It is an open question how large the gap is
between the integral and relaxed solutions of the primal problem, but this process still gives
us a way to estimate good prices for data.
Even without the assumptions of this theorem, we could try to use gradient descent to
find locally optimal A. We just don't have as many convergence guarantees.
Using the system above, we are able to efficiently get an estimation of the value of each
data set by solving the dual optimization problem. This is nice in that it gives a clear way
to value data sets in general, but it does not necessary provide a method which we may use
to allocate data. One simple way to do this would be to first, given information from firms
and vendors, calculate the prices {pj} using the quadratic approximation technique. Then,
given these prices, the system decides which firms get allocated which data by solving the
optimization Si = argmax (V(S) - E p) . In this way, the system allocates data to firms
SE[m] jES
that maximize their net utility. Such an allocation, called a take it or leave it mechanism,
will be studied in more detail in the next chapter.
Firm Competition
In the above formulation of the data valuation problem, it was assumed that there exist
some exogenous limits on data reproduction. It was also assumed that firms utilities are
independent of one another. In reality, this is an assumption we would like to relax to
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analyze the situation in which one firm's learning impacts another firms utility. One simple
way to do this would be to associate a row vector ai =< ai 1 , .ai > with each firm fi such
that their utility, instead of being simply Vi(Si) now becomes E aijVj(Sj). Now, the entries
j=1
of ai encode how much each firm cares about the success of others and this modification
makes the game something closer to a zero sum game. Now, note that in the case of no
competition, if there are no limits on data reproduction, the socially optimal allocation is to
give all data to every firm. In the case there is competition, the integer program becomes
n n
max Eaij E y(j, S)Vj (S)
j=1 i=1 SC[m]
s.t. y(j, S) 1 Vj C {1, ... , n}
SC [rn]
y0j, S) E to, 1} Vj (E f{1, .. , n}, S C [m]
Note that the above problem does not include any constraints on the number of times
vendors reproduce data, however, given some structure on the vectors ai, it is no longer
optimal to give all data to everyone.
To see this, consider the case that a, =< a, -3, -, ... , -1 > where a, # are very large.
With a, 3 large enough, we see that it becomes socially optimal for vendors to simply replicate
data once and give it all to firm fi. Hence, competition, even in this simple formulation, can
endogenously limit reproduction of data.
In this chapter, we described a way to model data valuation as an integer program, and
subsequent methods with which to analyze said program. These approximations are shown
in many cases to be computationally cheap and in simulations perform well.
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Chapter 5
Price Driven Mechanisms
5.1 Greedy Truthful Mechanisms
In the previous chapters, the price of data was determined endogenously to incentivize firms
to report truthfully and to maximize social welfare. This paradigm focuses on the firms
assuming that vendors have very few degrees of freedom. In addition to these results we would
like to understand the dynamics from the vendors perspective as well. The vendors' only
degree of freedom is the price they offer their data for. In general, prices are dynamic values
updated to optimize profit, not necessarily to incentivize truthfulness, although this can
sometimes happen as in the case of the VCG mechanism. Motivated by these considerations,
in this chapter we consider other price centric methods of assigning data allocations.
In [48] and 1491, the authors describe an iterative pricing method used in combinatorial
auctions to assign allocations. In their case, they consider an vector of prices p = {p3 }
provided exogenously to the system with which the bidders must then decide which bundle
of goods optimizes their welfare. Any transaction allocates data sets Si C [m] to firm fi.
Assume that the marginal value of any dataset is nonnegative.
Definition 31. These sets {S1,..., S} are called feasible if, given replication constraints
k1, ... , km for each of the data sets, the sets satisfy the constraint that for all j E [in], E 1 =
ijjESi
kj.
Note that we could have used the constraint 1< kj, however, in our case, with
ijESi
nondecreasing valuations, any socially optimal solution must use all data possible, otherwise,
more social welfare could be obtained.
Definition 32. In a data valuation game, with n firms and m data sets, given prices p = {p,}
for each piece of data, firms can calculate S* = argmax Vi(S) - E pj. If the sets Si are
SC[m] jES
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feasible, the prices p and the sets Si are called a Walrasian equilibrium if Si = S . If some
data set dk is unallocated, set Pk = 0.
Suppose that the system is trying to calculate the best Si to increase total learning.
n
Define OPT(V, p, k) = max Vi (Si). Suppose that social welfare is measured as total
Si feasible
learning 1 V(Si).
i=1
Theorem 33. In a data valuation game any Walrasian equilibrium yields a socially optimal
allocation Si.
Proof. Consider some set of prices p and corresponding allocations {S*}. Suppose that Si
is the optimal feasible allocation given by OPT(Vi, p, k). For each i E [n] we have that
Vt(S,) - E p, > V(Si) - E p3 . Putting this together for all i gives
j~s jESi
Vi(ST) - Zpj > V(SO)-Ypi
i=1 jES i1Ei
V(S) -E pj >OPT(Vi,p,k)- E Ep
i=1 JES i=1 jEgi
n m
Z V1(S,;) - ( k3p3 > OPT(Vi, p, k) - E kSpji=1 j=1 j=1
Vt(S;) > OPT(V, p, k)
So {SZ} must be a socially optimal allocation.
The trouble is both guaranteeing that such equilibria exist and finding them. Even
calculating a single set S* could take exponential time, and that is just one part of this
problem. The payment structure may result in negative utility for the firms and hence,
would not be useful in our case. Motivated by this framework, the goal is now to create an
truthful mechanism that attempts to efficiently maximize both learning and profit. Some of
our earlier work utilized a greedy algorithm which auctioned off data sets one at a time. This
works truthfully in the case of separable or E separable data, however, this is a very strong
assumption. In more general settings, such a greedy method could be manipulated by the
bidders who may lie about their valuation functions Vi. In fact, in this case, the mechanism
is highly sensitive to the order that data is auctioned, and in general, it is always possible
to construct examples in which bidders manipulate their values for data sold early, in order
to optimize their wealth with information sold later.
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Instead of iteratively selling the data sets, we might consider greedily allocating datasets
one at a time, minimizing the risk firms manipulate the system in the method described
above. Consider the following. A shopkeeper has m goods dl, ... , d" with prices pi, ... , pm
and over the course of a day, n customers arrive to buy goods. Each customer buys the
bundle of goods that optimize their welfare given the posted prices, and the shopkeeper
would like to adjust the prices to account for demand. As each customer comes in and buys
some subset of goods S C {d, ... , dm}, the shopkeeper takes that as a signal of the demand
for each good and adjusts prices p3 -+ pj + e for j E S and Pk - Pk - 6 for e, 6 > 0. Hence, by
the end of the day, goods that were bought many times should have a higher price than those
that weren't, reflecting their higher value. The algorithm we will use to greedily allocate
data sets will be along a similar vein as this.
Consider a data valuation game where the data sets are given initial prices p(O) = {},
and suppose that the optimization problem S* = argmax V(zis) - E pj can be calculated
SC[m] jeS
efficiently for each firm. Note that in general this is a strong assumption and will be relaxed
in later discussion. With this, we randomly permute the n firms fi, initialize prices, and set
demand increments 6, e > 0. Imagine in this case that there are no reproduction limits kj
and that data vendors would like to extract as much profit as possible from valuable data.
Now, consider the first firm fi selected from our random ordering. Given prices, p(O) this
firm can calculate S* = argmax V1,(S1)) - > pj, and is allocated the set S*, while paying
SC [M] jES
pj for each data set dj such that j E S*. Then we may update the prices p(O) - p(l) such
that if j E Si*, p. - p 3 + e and if j 0 S*, pj -+ pj - 6 . We can do this for each data
set in the ordering to obtain an allocation Si for each fi and corresponding payments to
the vendors. Note that, as mentioned above, the more valuable data sets will be bought
more often, yielding both higher prices and higher purchase rates and hence at the end of
the process will attain the most revenue. Thus the gross revenue of each vendor at the end
of the algorithm gives an estimate of the relative value of each data set. This process is
summarized by the following:
Theorem 34. In a data valuation game the Iterative Allocation Mechanism defined above
is truthful.
Proof. To show that this is truthful, suppose a firm provides a valuation function i in-
stead of their true valuation V. In this case, they will be allocated S according to S=
argmax i(zis) - E pj compared to the set Si = argmax Vi(zis) - E pj they are allocated
SC[rM] jES S [,M] jES
when honest. However, by construction
Vi(zis) - EPJ > V(zig) - Zmp
jEsi jgs
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Algorithm 4 Iterative Allocation Mechanism
Input: V1, ... , Vn: valuation functions; di, ... , dn: datasets; e, 6 > 0 increments; Pi, ... , PM
initial prices.
1: Randomly permute the set {1, ... , n}.
2: for i from 1 to n do
3: Calculate Si = argmax Vi(S) - E pj
SC[m] jES
4: Allocate Si to firm fi
5: Update prices
6: Vj E S,, p- p7 +e
7: V3 j S,,, P, P, - 6
8: Return: Allocation {Sj}, prices pj(i) where pj(i) is the price paid for j E Si by firm i.
and hence, truthfulness is a dominant strategy.
Thus, firms who participate in such a system have no incentive to lie about their val-
uations of any data. Assuming that the maximization max Vi(zis) - E p can be quickly
SC[m] jes
calculated, this gives us a truthful, efficient way to allocate data among firms for prices that
reflect demand. This is already good and yields several other related results. If we initialize
prices uniformly, the prices at the end of the process should give an estimate of value for.
individual data.
Corollary 35. Consider a data valuation game using the iterative allocation mechanism to
assign allocations using uniform initial price p(O) =0, . Assume that the marginal value of
data set d1 is always greater than C1 and that the marginal value of every other data set is
less than C2 with C2 < C1. Finally, suppose e = 6. In this case, the final price p(n) has the
property that pi Pk for all k $ 1.
Proof. We can show this fact by induction on the number of firms. In the case n = 1 we
see that pi = Pk e for all k E [m]. Assume this holds for n < k and consider the case
n = k. By our induction hypothesis we see that p(k - 1) has pi > Pk for all k 7 1. In this
case there are two possibilities. If at time k - 1 we have pi > Pk for some k $ 1, then even
if dk is allocated and d, isn't we have that pi > Pk at time k. On the other hand, if at time
k - 1 pi = Pk for some k $ 1, then dk will never be allocated when dj. To see this, suppose
P1 = Pk and dk is allocated and d, is not. Then if S = argmax Vk-1(zk-ls) - Z pj, such that
SC[m] jES
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1 #' we have that
Vk_1(zk-_9) - Emp
jE5
< C2 - 01 + Vk-l(zk_1S\{k}u{1}) 
- p
jE5\{k}U{1}
< V-1(zkl\{k}U l}) - p
iE5\{k}U{1}
which violates the maximality of 5 and therefore if dk is allocated, d, must be allocated
as well. However in this case at time k, Pi Pk as well, finishing the proof. El
Note that the same result holds if 6 = 0. Additionally, as was the case of our previous
greedy algorithm on separable data, we have that there is a relationship between the resulting
allocation and socially optimal allocations.
Corollary 36. Consider a data valuation game using the iterative allocation mechanism to
assign allocations with initial price p(O) and suppose c 6 = 0. In this case, if we consider
the resulting allocation {Si} of data sets to firms and define kj to be the number of times
dj is allocated, we have that {Si} maximizes social welfare under replication restrictions
E I = kj for all j C [m].
ilJESi
Proof. Proof of this follows from the fact that the prices remain fixed and each firm is
allocated their optimal set Si under these prices, hence p(O) and Si form a Walrasian equi-
librium. 0
Simulations show that with a large number of firms, over time prices settle down into
equilibrium. Additionally, the total profit passing through the system increases steadily.
This is seen in Figure 5-1.
Simulations using general valuation functions also exhibit similar profit increases using
this method. Figure 5-2 was generated by first creating a model as in the end of Chapter
2. Then, valuation functions V were calculated and the iterative allocation mechanism was
implemented. The graph clearly shows that over time, prices adjust in order to maximize
profit.
Even with all of these results, calculating the
maximization problem
-- Profit
S; =argmax Vi (zis) - SP
SC[m] Es
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Figure 5-1: Prices and Profit Over Time
is generally hard. We would like to introduce
a framework to simplify this component of the
algorithm. With this in mind, note that in Wal-
rasian equilibria, it was assumed that data ven-
dors artificially limit the supply of all data sets
by raising prices in order to increase their rev-
enue.
If a price pj were so low that each firm is
allocated dj, the vendor might want to raise the
price to increase profit possibly reducing the number of times it is sold. Here prices and
supply are inversely correlated. Additionally it can be shown that using a VCG mechanism
if kj = n for all k c [m] each person be allocated all data and would pay nothing. This is
clearly suboptimal for vendors. Thus it is in their interest to limit access to their data. In the
previous cases this limitation was provided by the number of times a data set was replicated,
however, it could equally have been done by only partially allocating data to firms. In other
words if the data set dj consists of thousands of labeled points and firm fi is allocated zij = ,
they would be randomly assigned 60 percent of the data in dj. This effectively smooths out
the function Vi in such a way that the optimization S7 = argmax V(zis) - E pj becomes
SC[m] jes
more tractable.
Definition 37. A data valuation game with fractional allocations is a data valuation game
in which an allocation randomly assigns a given percentage of a data set dj to a firm fi.
In these games it is reasonable to assume that due to the randomness in the assignment
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of data, the functions V (zji, ... , zim), where zij E [0, 1], are differentiable. Furthermore, due
to the fact that additional data gives diminishing accuracy returns, we may assume that
the Ii's are strictly concave. With these two assumptions in place, instead of the hard
combinatorial maximization problem we had for firms before, we can now calculate, given
m
a set of prices p = {pj}, the maximization max Vi(zei, ... , zim) - E zijpj. By assumption
ziE[O,1]m
the objective V(zil, ... , Zim)- E zijpj is concave for any p over the compact set [0, 1]' andj=1
thus has a unique maximizer. More over, this maximization can be done in a short amount
of time using either KKT conditions -or something like stochastic gradient ascent. Thus, we
can now run our greedy truthful algorithm efficiently. There is one caveat to this and that
is when the prices are updated, they should take into account the amount of the data set
that was allocated. In other words, we set 6 = 0 and for all prices, pj -+ pj + zijc after data
is allocated to firm fi.
Algorithm 5 Efficient Iterative Allocation
Input: V1 , ... , Vn: differentiable strictly concave valuation functions; dl, ... , dm: datasets;
e > 0 increment; pi, ... , pm, initial prices.
1: Randomly permute the set {1, ... , n} via o.
2: for i from 1 to n do
3: Calculate z = argmax V(Za(i)l, ... , Zoj)m) - zo(j)jpy
zo )jE=0,1]m 1
4: Allocate z*( to firm f0 g) and update prices p -+ p3 + z*igc
5: Return: Allocation {zi}, prices pj(i) where p3 (i) is the price paid for the percentage zij
of data dj by firm i.
Note that the above algorithm, due to the randomized sampling, is only truthful in
expectation, however, this is a small price to pay for the huge increase in efficiency.
5.2 Competitive Pricing
The problem of evaluating the proper price for data and information is difficult on many
levels. One reason for this difficulty is that it is difficult for firms and vendors alike to predict
the outcome of processing data and information without having access to it. Without buying
the information, one cannot know how much it's worth. It would be akin to someone buying
property blindfolded, knowing only after the transaction occurs how much the home is worth.
However, it might be possible to have a third party do such a valuation (which is what the
above work is concerned with.) Also, one might be able to evaluate the value of a data set by
examining a proxy dataset that has similar properties. In this case, the notion of differential
65
privacy would become highly invaluable. Another reason why valuing data is so difficult has
to do with the combinatorial complexity of the problem. Even if firms and vendors knew
exactly how much obtaining data would help them, it is unclear how competition between
vendors affects prices. This section intends to focus on precisely this problem. In other
words, assuming firms know exactly how they would benefit from information, what should
prices be set to in equilibrium?
One interesting property of data is its low marginal cost for reproduction. In this respect,
it is similar to other electronic goods such as software. There is some economic literature
dealing with how to price such goods [501 but no current research considers competition
between different vendors. One could imagine selling a single data set d, to n firms fi, ... , fn
who each have value V > V2 > ... > V for that data. If the data set's price is set to p E R>o
then any firm fi with Vi > p will buy the data, yielding a profit of E p. In this case,
iV1%>p
the optimization problem on the side of the vendor selling the data becomes max E p and
PERii>p
solving for the optimal p* E R yields the correct price for the data set d1 . Specifying such a
p* automatically results in an allocation in which all fi with Vi > p receive the data.
The story gets more complicated when more data sets are considered. Consider the same
example as above, however with the addition of another data set d2 . Here, we suppose that
each firm has value Vi(K) E R>o for different combinations of the two data sets. Vi takes the
subset , C {1, 2} that fi is allocated. Now, suppose that there exist prices p = [p1, P2] for the
two data sets. Each firm, in order to maximize utility, will optimize the following expression
max Vi(K) - E pj in terms of , given the prices P1, P2. Knowing this will be the behavior of
KC{1,2} jEK
the firms and leveraging the fact that the values V(K) remain fixed allows the vendors of the
two data sets to adjust their prices accordingly. In particular, denote the optimal subset of
{1, 2} chosen by firm fi given value function Vi and prices p = [PI, P2] as K(Vi, P, P2 ). Then
note that each vendor of the data sets would like to optimize max E i1 E K(Vi,Pj,p-j)p.
PiER
Then we define a price of data sets d, and d2 to be a Nash equilibrium p C R 2 . We may,
if we would like, alter the above optimization to include a lower bound on possible prices
offered, representing the cost of data production and processing. Regardless, even in the
case with two data sets, it is clear this problem is becoming more and more computationally
challenging.
We may now state the problem in full generality. Suppose we have n firms and m vendors
Definition 38. Define a competitive pricing game as a game such that there are m
vendors of data sets d1 , ... , d, who may set prices pi,...,pm for this information. Addition-
ally, there exist firms with valuation functions Vi(K) C R>o that dictate how much util-
ity firms obtain when they are allocated some subset K C ({1, ... ,m}) of the data. With
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this, given actions p = [p1, ... ,pM], vendor j obtains utility E pj where r,(Vi, p)
iIjEK(V,pj,p-j)
argmax Vi (K) - E pj.
KC{1,...,m} jEV
Note that the only agents in this game are the vendors who determine the price of their
data set. The firms have fixed responses given fixed prices and are hence non strategic. This
leads us to our definition for competitive pricing.
Definition 39. Given an competitive pricing game, the competitive prices for data d1 , ... , dm
are the actions of the data vendors at equilibrium.
In other words, data should be priced in such a way that no individual vendor selling
a data set has the incentive to change their price. If such an equilibrium can be found, it
should give an idea of the value of particular pieces of information in the market structure.
However, converging to such an equilibrium is not trivial. There is no clear algorithm to
perform the optimization necessary, and worse, there is the possibility of reaching multiple
equilibria. From the brief discussion above, this may not be a problem since the value of
one good might be intrinsically linked with the price of another good. For example if d,
is only really useful with d 2 and d2 's price P2 is incredibly high, then the d, will not be as
valuable. This game models the dynamics from the vendor's perspective and gives a sense of
how complementary and substitutive effects among different data sets influence competition
and can therefore impact prices. To see how such a system might work in a simple case
consider the following.
Example 40. Suppose we have separable data d1 ,..., d, and firms fi,..., f" with valuations
V(dj) for each firm fi and data set dj. In this case, given a set of prices p = {pi}, the
optimization performed by the firms buying some bundle of data becomes
K(Vi, p) = argmax V (,) - E pj
. . .{...,m}
= argmax E V(dj) - p_
KC{1...,m}
={jE{, ... ,m}s.t. V (dj) - pj > 0}.
In this case, ,(Vi, p) is quite easy to calculate and additionally, optimizing prices becomes
an easy task as well since for each vendor, given a set of prices p = {pi}, their optimization
becomes
67
max E pjPj >0 ir-VjP)
-max E pPj > iJVi(dj)-p
3 >0
and the optimizations of the different vendors become totally decoupled. Hence, once
each vendor calculates p* = argmax E p, an optimal Nash equilibria is found with
pER i|v(d)-p>0
competitive prices given by p* {pj}. Note that this is similar to the greedy algorithm used
earlier in this chapter as it simply optimizes a value for a single data set at once.
Note that in this example, it only took one pass through the different data sets, to price
them accurately. In the case of non separable data, once the first set of prices is determined
the vendors might continue to individually adjust their prices. This individual adjustment
takes a particular form. Given prices p= {pj}, vendor vj has the choice of changing pj, all
else being equal. Here, as p, ranges, we see that each firm fi buys dj once p crosses some
threshold tij(p-j). This threshold tij(p-j) can be calculated as the pj that satisfies
argmax Vi () - E Pk
C{1,...,m} kEK
s.t. jEK
argmax V(r,) - Pk.
KC{1,...,m} kEK
S.t. jK
Hence, given prices p= {pj}, each vendor can individually maximize p3 by taking p=
argmax > p3 .p3 ER i~p<ti(p-j)
There is no guarantee that such an algorithm will converge to a set of prices. In essence
such a system is just a best response algorithm which is efficient if the tij values can be
calculated or estimated quickly.
In this chapter, we've seen how to construct efficient algorithms to allocate data in a way
that maximizes profit. In addition, we have proposed an simulated a model for competition
between information sources. The notion of Walrasian equilibria and the structure of these
kinds of auctions are a good description for this problem and we think would readily extend
to the more complicated setting
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied different methods to value data and information. Up to now,
there did not exist a systematic way to describe the economics of data or a way to value
information. The models, methods and results in this work are a step towards such a system.
If those who use information don't have access to a method to value new information, they
will not be able to fully realize their potential to learn and adapt. By the same token, if
those selling their data cannot price it, they will not be fairly compensated. We have seen
that by putting reasonable structures on how firms learn using data sets, we can calculate
optimal fair allocations of information, revealing the value of different sources of data. Such
allocations may be constructed such that each participant has no incentive to lie and every
incentive to participate. This has clear implications in several different domains including
finance, insurance, and retail where private information is at a premium and has the potential
to significantly increase profits. Our system is superior to those that exist currently which
rely upon blindly choosing collections of data to buy with the hope of improving predictions
and decision making in the future.
In the modern world, sometimes it feels like big brother is always watching. The main
difference between Orwellian notion of a surveillance state and our current climate is that
the entities collecting our information are firms like Google, Facebook and Amazon who use
it for monetary gain. It stands to reason that for their gain we should be compensated for
the loss of our individual privacy. Such compensation, as described in the results of this
research, would both encourage those with sensitive information to share it, and dissuade
firms from collecting too much information and infringing unnecessarily on our privacy. In
this way, we think that this research has policy implications for governments who would like
to preserve privacy while maintaining economic innovation.
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6.1 Directions for Future Work
While the results in this thesis represent a huge leap forward in understanding the economics
of data and information, there are still some holes in our current knowledge. It would be
useful to understand how competition between firms impacts data valuation. In particular, if
different firms would like to monopolize information or simply limit the information gained by
competitors, the problem now isn't simply about their learning, but the learning of others. A
general model for this interaction is elusive, however, in a simple case one could imagine that
firms get utility based on their own learning and are penalized linearly for the learning of the
other firms. Mathematically, if each firm's learning is described by the functions V(S) for
i E [n], the total utility of firm i can be written as U (S1 , ... , Sn) = Vi(Si) + E aiV (Sj). The
acj's could be thought of as representing the amount firm fi cares about the success of firm
fj. In this way, the model for utility is similar to a weighted zero sum game. One question
becomes, if there is some structure on the functions V(Sj) and the matrix A = {ajj}, is
it possible to extend our previous analysis. Note that this is a simple case of competition
between firms and understanding the most general case is an even tougher challenge. It would
also be interesting to analyze the case in which there was some kind of feedback between
the firm's learning and the vendors. In this case, we might say that if by sharing data, you
expose yourself to greater cost in the future, you as a data vendor should be compensated
commensurately. It would also be useful to think about dynamics of data valuation over
time. In reality, goals and priors of firms are changing constantly, therefore the value of
information must change accordingly. Finally, one aspect of the data valuation problem
glossed over in this work was the actual algorithm used to incorporate new information with
existing priors. Generally it was assumed that the firm came in with this algorithm however,
perhaps they simply come in with the goal of learning and the system we have described not
only allocates them data, but recommends the best algorithm they can use to learn.
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